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Introduction 
 
In the sixth century BC, archaic Greek philosophy underwent a fundamental shift, 
originating in Magna Graecia. Rather than explaining the world in a prose treaty positing one 
single physical element to account for the existence of everything, Parmenides focussed his 
thoughts onto eternal Being, expressing them in poetry. To this highly abstract notion of Being 
he denied all the characteristics which had been fundamental to his predecessors to explain 
human perceptions such as change and movement. The few characteristics he did attribute to 
Being were those which were not logically incompatible with the fact that Being is and Not-Being 
is not. The account about Being is announced as the ‘unshaken heart of well-rounded truth’ 
(Ἀληθείης εὐκυκλέος ἀτρεμὲς ἦτορ, B1.29)1 and therefore commonly referred to as ἀλήθεια. 
However, Parmenides did not entirely break with the philosophical tradition, even though 
he chose to write a poem instead of a prose treatise and elaborated on Being rather than on 
monist cosmology, since he included a more traditional cosmology in his poem. In this part of the 
poem, the δόξαι,2 two cosmogonical Forms, Fire and Night, are introduced to account for 
change, movement, and plurality in the physical world. These two accounts, the ἀλήθεια and the 
δόξαι, contrary as they may seem, are part of the same poem. Both are revelations, provided by 
a goddess3 to a κοῦρος (‘young man’). This κοῦρος, as described in the proem, is brought to the 
goddess in a chariot. At the end of the proem, the goddess promises to reveal two things to him: 
the ἀλήθεια and the ‘false opinions of mortals, in which there is no true conviction’ (βροτῶν 
δόξας, ταῖς οὐκ ἔνι πίστις ἀληθής, B1.30). These two accounts form the remaining two sections 
of the poem, which has been fragmentarily transmitted. Although the δόξαι are said to lack true 
conviction and trustworthiness, the goddess nevertheless includes them in her revelation. In 
subchapter 3.1, I shall come back to the exact relation between the ἀλήθεια and the δόξαι, 
encompassing simultaneously many differences and significant similarities. 
The tendency in scholarship is to separate the literary aspect of the poem from the 
philosophical, the form from the content.4 Some steps against this tendency of disconnecting the 
poetic form and philosophical content have already been taken by some scholars such as 
Morgan and Robbiano, who explored respectively the philosophical significance of the employed 
                                                          
1 All Greek quotations of Parmenides are taken of the edition of Coxon (1986); deviations are indicated in 
footnotes. Concerning the numbering of the fragments, I have used the Diels Kranz system, so all 
quotations of Parmenides are DK28. All translations in this thesis are of my own hand. 
2 Whereas the conventional name for this part of Parmenides’ poem is δόξα, I shall call it δόξαι, since 
Parmenides always uses the plural to designate this part (βροτῶν δόξας in B1.30 and δόξας...βροτείας in 
B8.51); cf. Robbiano (2005) 218. 
3 The identity of this goddess is disputed. It could be Dike (Popper (1992) 12 n.2; cf. Deichgräber (1959) 9, 
based on Sextus Empiricus’ identification), but as the goddess in B1.28 refers to Dike in the third person 
singular, this seems unlikely (cf. Furley (1973) 3). It could also be one of the Muses or even Ἀλήθεια 
herself (Bowra (1953) 47), or Persephone (Gemelli Marciano (2008) 35-36). Another possibility is that we 
are dealing with an unnamed, but polymorph deity uniting Dike, Ananke, Moira, Peitho and Themis in 
herself (Mourelatos (2008) 25-26). To me it seems most likely that the goddess is intentionally left 
unidentified (as Bowra (1953) 47-48 and Furley (1973) 3 argue), so in this thesis I will simply refer to the 
revealing deity as ‘the goddess’. 
4 Examples of research focusing on the literary side of the poem are Bowra (1953) (about the origins of 
the images of the proem) and Miller (2006). A purely philosophical interpretation (of mainly the ἀλήθεια) is 
given by Curd (1998) and McKirahan (2008). 
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mythology and the used literary strategies to draw the audience into Parmenides’ philosophy.5 
Leaving these two pioneers aside, most research aiming at connecting the literary to the 
philosophical focusses on the question why Parmenides chose to write in poetry rather than in 
prose, like his predecessors had done.6  
Answers to this question tend to include that Parmenides wished to reject the theories of 
his predecessors who wrote in prose,7 choosing instead to connect his own work to the 
traditional framework of the poets of the past, mainly Homer and Hesiod. One of the various 
themes emphasising the link between Parmenides’ own poem and his poetic predecessors is 
authority. By placing almost his whole poem in the mouth of a revealing goddess, he frames the 
transferred knowledge as divine.8 Since the gods traditionally spoke in dactylic hexameters (e.g. 
in Homer and Hesiod), Parmenides legitimated his new, philosophical discourse by anchoring it 
in the poetic tradition in which the gods were the authority of all knowledge.9 Furthermore, it was 
epistemologically convenient for Parmenides to connect himself to Hesiod,10 since he wished to 
convey two types of knowledge, only one of which was said to be true (ἀληθής), which echoes 
the statement of the Muses in Hesiod that only they know the difference between the truth and 
lies they will tell.11 Since the claim to truth was already codified in hexameters by Hesiod in a 
way unknown to the prose of that time, it was logical for Parmenides to choose verse when he 
wished to claim the same truth-level. 
Scholars also point out more pragmatic reasons for the choice for poetry: poetry might 
have reached a larger audience than prose12 and poetry is easier to remember than prose.13 
Whereas the question to Parmenides’ motive for choosing poetry certainly discusses an 
                                                          
5 Morgan (2000); Robbiano (2005). 
6 The quality of his poetry is generally regarded as rather low. For the ancient judgement on Parmenides 
as a poet, see Diels (1897) 5-6. Modern scholars tend to agree with this disapproval: Barnes (1982) 155 
calls Parmenides’ choice for poetry ‘hard to excuse’; Calogero (1970) 9 states that Parmenides ‘has to 
struggle toilsomely to force his new ideas into the hexameters’; Morgan (2000) 67 refers to Parmenides’ 
verses as ‘commonly stigmatised as clumsy and pedestrian’. 
7 E.g. Granger (2007) 416-417. He rejected their world-views on the ground that they did not take the unity 
of Being into account, so Parmenides’ choice for poetry could be seen as emphasizing the great 
distinction between his own conceptions and the ones of his forbearers writing in prose (cf. Kahn (2003) 
157). However, a disagreement in content would not necessarily entail a formal rupture with his 
predecessors. 
8 Kahn (2003) 157. 
9 Most (1999) 355. 
10 Wright (1997) 5-6. For a more elaborate discussion of the foundation of Parmenides’ epistemology in 
Hesiod, see Iribarren (forthcoming).  
11 Hesiod, Theogony 26-28. 
12 E.g. Granger (2007) 405. The larger audience would mainly be due to the public or semi-public readings 
and competitions of poetry in archaic time (Finnegan (1977) 166). I follow Bowra  (1953) 47 and Gentili 
(1988) 156 in assuming a large and general audience for Parmenides’ poem rather than an inner circle 
(for which e.g. Gemelli Marciano (2002) 89-90 and Thesleff (1990) 110 argue). Thesleff’s main reason for 
regarding Parmenides’ poem as esoteric, the fact that it did not become generally known, since only 
philosophers commented upon it, can easily be countered by the references to Parmenides by non-
philosophical writers, e.g. the contrast between δοκεῖν and εἶναι in Aeschylus’ Agammemnon 788-789 
(Kouremenos (1993) 260) and the allusions in the proem of Aristophanes’ Clouds (the choice between two 
possible discourses in 112-118 could refer to Parmenides’ two ways in B2; Iribarren (2013) 138-139). 
13 Kahn (2003) 157. Since it takes less effort to remember a text when rhythm or metre has been added to 
it, as was recognized already in Antiquity (Aristotle, Rhetoric 3.1409b1ff.), the poem could more easily be 
memorized by both the poet and his audience. 
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important aspect of the relation between form and content in his poem, the literary form and 
philosophical content are connected even further, for example in the fact that they share 
common notions, as I shall demonstrate.  
In this thesis, I will therefore focus on an understudied aspect of the form-content relation 
in Parmenides. Circularity, defined as an either two- or three-dimensional concept of radial 
invariance, is a regularly recurring notion in all three sections of Parmenides’ poem (proem, 
ἀλήθεια, and δόξαι). It is employed both in form (e.g. ringcomposition, see chapter 1.2) and in 
content (for example the rings the cosmos consists of, see chapter 3.2). Although the 
significance of some of these instances of circularity has been studied thoroughly (e.g. the well-
rounded ball to which Being is compared has received a great deal of scholarly attention, see 
chapter 2.3), the importance of others has been overlooked in scholarship. In this MA-thesis, I 
will provide a systematic overview of the instances of circularity throughout the poem. A notion in 
both form and content, I shall argue that circularity is of fundamental importance for the 
philosophical doctrine of Parmenides. This philosophical significance of circularity lies in the fact 
that the instances in which it is evoked all figure his theory in some way. 
The figurability of theory, i.e. the means by which Parmenides’ theory is figurable and 
actually figured, may come across as a paradox, because of the Platonic resonance of the 
Greek θεωρία, from which the English ‘theory’ etymologically derives. Plato’s θεωρία carries the 
implication of the contemplation of the Platonic Ideas, which can be hardly conveyed in language 
nor figured. In this thesis, however, I employ the word ‘theory’ in the modern, English sense of 
the word, so without the Platonic connotation. 
The theory which is figured by means of circularity should be understood in its broadest 
sense. Whereas sometimes the figured theory can be the philosophical doctrine of the ἀλήθεια 
or the one of the δόξαι, at other times it can be (the unity of) the poem as a whole, an element of 
the narrative in the proem to introduce these two doctrines, or a particular aspect of the doctrine 
of the ἀλήθεια or the δόξαι. 
 Figuring the theory entails three different ways in which circularity contributes to the 
theoretical elaboration of the doctrine. Circularity is no mere ornament, but a substantial and 
irremovable part of Parmenides’ theory. The three ways I shall discuss, which can overlap in 
individual instances, are didactic, polemic, and reflective. 
 Firstly, circularity can figure the theory by being didactic, showing (an element of) the 
theory by demonstrating it. Circles and spheres are particularly apt for this, because their visual 
nature makes it easier for an audience (both the internal audience, i.e. the κοῦρος, and the 
external audience14) to grasp something more abstract. In the reasoning for the attribution of 
completeness to Being, for example, a comparison to a well-rounded ball is used to visually 
show this abstract notion of completeness to the audience, making it easier to comprehend (cf. 
subchapter 2.3). This ball therefore functions as a didactic and heuristic device. 
 Furthermore, circularity can be employed to figure the theory by polemic contrast. This 
opposing distinction can be directed either against predecessors and rival theories, or, more 
often in case of Parmenides, against the other part of his own composition (so circularity in the 
                                                          
14 The external audience of Parmenides comprised both listeners and readers. The setting of poetic 
performances means that his work was to a large extent meant to be heard, although he was also 
anticipating it to be read (Havelock (1983) 9). This Presocratic literature is located in the grey area of 
continuity, since orality and literacy are not mutually exclusive categories (Finnegan (1977) 24). 
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ἀλήθεια contrasts it to the δόξαι and vice versa). The plurality of the rings out of which the 
cosmos of the δόξαι exists, for instance, is placed on the same line as the well-rounded ball 
Being is compared to. The fact that circularity is employed in the description of both elements 
invites for reflection and comparison by the audience. Circularity in this instance stresses the 
contrast between the unity which lies at the basis of the ἀλήθεια (there is only one sphere) and 
the plurality as key characteristic of the δόξαι (there is a plurality of spherical rings; see section 
3.2). 
 Finally, another way in which a theory can be figured is reflectivity. A circular object can 
reflect on an aspect of the theory, whether that be (an aspect of) the compositional section to 
which it belongs or the unity of the composition. To give an example, the chariot of the proem 
reflects on the poem’s unity. Although the chariot comprises duality, since it has two wheels, it 
also forms a unity, since there is only a single chariot. The round wheels of the chariot reflect on 
the way in which also Parmenides’ poem consists of two revelations, but can and should 
nevertheless also be seen as one poem forming a whole, just like the chariot. I shall describe 
this metapoetical reflectivity in subchapter 1.1. 
In this thesis, I shall thus answer the question how circularity figures Parmenides’ theory 
and what its philosophical significance is. The theory under discussion can refer to any section 
or aspect of Parmenides’ poem and its figuration happens through didactic, polemic, and/or 
reflective adhibitions of circularity in all its forms, both in compositional structure and content. 
 The methodology I will adhibit in this MA-thesis is close reading combined with concepts 
originating in art theory. One might ask why it is valuable, useful, or legitimate to transfer 
concepts from another scholarly discipline into one’s own. I shall take these concepts, whose 
theoretical basis comes from Louis Marin’s semiology of visual arts,15 in order to examine the 
ways in which Parmenides shapes his theory by visually giving it a form.  
 Parmenides employs the notion of circularity as a visual tool to figure his theory. 
Circularity should be regarded as visual, because of the effect that people easily see it before 
their mind’s eyes due to their experiences with this geometrical form in daily life. Some instances 
of circularity in Parmenides’ poem can even be regarded as ekphraseis, which are vivid 
descriptions bringing the content before the mind’s eye.16 An example of ekphrasis entailing 
circularity in Parmenides is the visual description of the wheels of the chariot in the proem (cf. 
section 1.1), whose level of details brings it vividly before the eye of the audience. However, not 
all instances of circularity are ekphraseis, because the notion is not always vividly and 
elaborately described, but sometimes simply alluded to. Generally speaking, circularity is 
employed by Parmenides as a visual tool, with a purpose similar to the one of ekphraseis: 
bringing a vivid picture before the mind’s eye. However, circularity is not only employed for the 
rhetorical enlivening effect on the audience, but, more than an average ekphrasis, it also 
conveys the philosophical message on a conceptual level. Due to its right combination of being 
abstract (and thus widely employable throughout the poem) and being concrete (helping people 
to visually imagine even more abstract concepts such as Being), circularity is a very helpful 
visual tool for Parmenides to convey elements of his theory. Because of its visual nature which 
easily evokes an image in the minds of the audience, circularity can legitimately be described by 
concepts from art theory, especially those who are meant to interpret elements of visual arts. 
                                                          
15 Marin (1989); Marin (1996). 
16 Definition of the ancient rhetorician Aetius Theon; cf. De Jonge (2016) 212. 
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These concepts will turn out useful for this purpose, for, having proven their value in describing 
the significance of objects in visual arts for the total understanding of the artwork, they will 
increase our understanding of the ways circles and spheres contribute to Parmenides’ doctrine, 
since circularity, due to its strong visual connotations in the audience’ minds, also can be seen 
as a visual tool in literature. Objects in visual arts and circularity in literature thus have their 
visual aspect and theoretical significance in common, which makes it valuable and useful to 
transfer those concepts from art theory to literature.  
One may ask if it is legitimate to take these concepts out of the field in which they have 
been developed. Are they not intrinsically connected to the understanding of the material to 
which they were meant to contribute? Although I grant that theories tend to be established with a 
particular corpus or study object in mind, this question asks for a more conceptual discussion on 
the function and aim of scientific theories which falls outside the scope of this thesis. 
Nevertheless, I would like to remark that there is a certain reciprocity between a theory and the 
material to which it is applied. Not only does the theory change our understanding of the 
material, it also works the other way around: certain material can change (our views about) the 
scientific theory. The application of a theory only becomes scientific when scholars do not hold 
on too rigidly to its fixedness, but grant that a theory stands in function of the interpretation of a 
text, which may mean that it needs to undergo some changes to better fulfil its purpose. 
Although the aim of a theory is and should be to cover as many instances as possible and to 
possess a widespread validity, its value does not lie in covering the highest number of instances, 
but in the quality of interpretation which the application of the theory provides to the single 
instances. Therefore, I regard it justifiable to transfer these concepts from the semiology of 
visual arts to archaic Greek poetry, provided that they be adapted in order to better fit this new 
material. I have adjusted the following definitions of frame and theoretical objects, which I will 
adhibit in this thesis, in order to serve this purpose. 
 The first concept I shall employ is the one of a ‘frame’. In the visual arts, a frame is one of 
the figurative tools of representation in paintings.17 Being a structural element of the picture’s 
construction, it defines the edges of the painting and hence supports the surface of 
representation.18 It is not simply an ornament, but an essential addition, since it causes the 
representation to identify itself by excluding other elements from sight and thus by pointing to the 
main representational object of contemplation.19 In this thesis, I will treat the ringcomposition as 
a textual equivalent of the frame, for the ringcomposition, defined as ‘a theme posed at the start 
and after a digression (which can be long or short) repeated at the end, so that the whole 
digression is surrounded by sentences of the same content and more or less similar wording’,20 
can fulfil the same deictic function as the frame in visual arts.  
I would like to make a distinction between two types of ringcomposition: the narrative 
ringcomposition and the figurative ringcomposition. By a narrative ringcomposition, I mean the 
use of ringcomposition as a logical or rhetorical device. The ringcomposition then functions as 
taking up the main narrative after a digression, as closing off an element of the description, as 
                                                          
17 Marin (1996) 80. 
18 Marin (1996) 82. 
19 Ibidem. 
20 Van Otterlo (1944) 3. 
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reminding the audience where the main story was heading or as repeating the elements the 
author wishes to emphasize.21  
The second type of ringcomposition, which has not previously been recognized, is the 
figurative ringcomposition. The figurative ringcomposition is more than just a narrative device: 
through figuration of the content by the shape of composition this very content is reinforced.22 
Since the literary device of ringcomposition figures the content of the lines involved in the 
ringcomposition, it adds significance to them. Needless to say, the figurative ringcomposition 
figures the theory in the sense that its form reflects on the theory’s content. 
Both types of ringcomposition can function as the textual equivalent of the frame: the 
narrative ringcomposition has the deictic function of directing the focus of the audience to the 
centre of the ringcomposition and the figurative ringcomposition does the same, but not only to 
the centre, but also to the way in which it reinforces the content by resembling it in shape. The 
deictic function of both ringcompositions also makes it a didactic device, since the audience’s 
attention is pointed towards a central point. 
 The second concept I shall employ is the theoretical object, which contributes to the 
reflective figuration of Parmenides’ theory. A theoretical object is a representational object 
whose description contains two dimensions, the intransitive and the transitive.23 In the transitive 
dimension, the theoretical object forms the representation of something else. In the intransitive 
dimension, the theoretical object signals that it not only presents something concrete, but also 
represents something different. Both these layers are constitutive of a theoretical object:  
it connects the object it represents (transitive dimension) with the signal that the object in 
question is in fact a representation (intransitive dimension). It thus reflects on its own 
representational capacity and thereby gives the tools to the audience to reflect upon its own 
functioning: the audience is invited to look for the layers of reflection that the discourse is 
implying. These layers often contain something that could not possibly be otherwise expressed 
(e.g. in a logical argumentation), but that entail a level of abstraction or suggestion that forces it 
to be expressed through the representation of the theoretical object. 
One could ask what the difference is between an allegory and a theoretical object in a 
text, since both concepts contain the notion of reflectivity. There are, however, two main 
differences. Firstly, with a full-blown allegory the presentational layer in the intransitive 
dimension is absent: it purely functions as representing something else, whereas with the 
theoretical object both the presentational layer and the representational layer are present at the 
same time. Although the intransitive dimension contains a sign that the theoretical object also 
represents something, the described object continues to have a function in the narrative on its 
                                                          
21 This narrative ringcomposition includes both Van Otterlo’s (Van Otterlo (1948) 8-9) inclusive 
ringcomposition and his anaphoric ringcomposition, the existence of which is denied by Steinrück (2013) 
9-10. 
22 A good example is the ringcomposition in the description of Achilles’ shield in Homer, Iliad 18. The 
whole scene is framed by the outer ring σάκος μέγα τε στιβαρόν τε (lines 478 and 609) and the first image 
on the shield to be spoken of (λοετρῶν Ὠκεανοῖο, line 489) is also the last (ποταμοῖο μέγα σθένος 
Ὠκεανοῖο, line 607). The striking point is that the Okeanos actually surrounds the shield (line 608). The 
double mentioning of the Okeanos, at the beginning and the end of the description, thus forms a figurative 
ringcomposition that resembles the round form of the shield itself. The shape of the literary device (the 
circle of the ringcomposition) thus reinforces the circular shape of the shield in the content of the lines 
involved in the ringcomposition. 
23 Marin (1996) 79. 
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own. In the case of the metapoetical and cosmologically reflective chariot which will be 
examined in chapter 1.1, for example, the chariot does not merely function as representing the 
metapoetical and cosmological layer, but also presents a chariot that functions in the narrative 
as bringing the κοῦρος to the revealing goddess. In a pure allegory this presentational layer 
would be absent. 
Secondly, the theoretical object is internally reflective, whereas the allegory is externally 
reflective. The two concepts appeal to different kind of readings. The internal structure of the text 
is irrelevant for the allegory: a certain passage is taken out of its context and taken to signify 
something that is not in the text. It thus has an external referent, often ethics or cosmology. A 
theoretical object, on the other hand, is internally reflective: the theoretical object also represents 
something outside of the description of that specific object, but the reference is nevertheless 
made to something within the text or artwork as a whole. One could even say that the theoretical 
object ‘allegorizes itself’: it does not project the meaning to the outside world, but elucidates the 
internal logic of the text itself. The text itself thus contains clues of its own interpretation, albeit in 
a different order. In the case of Parmenides, for example, the description of the chariot in the 
proem (see chapter 1.1) reflects on the unity of the ἀλήθεια and the δόξαι, and thus has an 
internal reflective referent.  
 The thesis is divided in three chapters, coinciding with the three compositional sections of 
Parmenides’ poem. In the first chapter, I will discuss the circular objects of the chariot wheels 
and door gates in the proem. The circularity here employed reflects on the compositional unity of 
the poem and the principal unity of the ἀλήθεια in contrast to the cosmological plurality of the 
δόξαι. Furthermore, I shall argue that a figurative ringcomposition reflects on the circular journey 
of the daughters of the Sun, thus establishing the underworld as the location of the revelation.  
In the second chapter, on circularity in the ἀλήθεια, I shall set forth how the goddess 
adhibits the image of a circle to reflect on the discourse, thus shaping the theory of the ἀλήθεια 
by recurrently coming back to one of its main premises. Besides, I shall argue that Being is not 
to be imagined as spherical or well-rounded, and that the visual tool of the comparison to a well-
rounded ball, both in form and content, is meant to didactically show the homogeneity and 
completeness of Being to the audience, helping them to reflect on its very essence.  
The third chapter will elaborate on the mistake of the mortals in the δόξαι, polemically 
reflecting on the conflict between the unity of the ἀλήθεια and the plurality of the δόξαι. 
Moreover, the various heterogeneous rings, out of which the cosmos is made, didactically 
demonstrate the cosmological views of the mortals and reflect on key differences between the 
two revelations of the goddess. The spherical moon in particular invites reflection on the very 
nature of the δόξαι through a polemic pun to Homer. 
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Chapter 1: Circularity as figuring concept in the proem 
 
 This first chapter, dealing with the way circularity functions as a poetical motif to figure 
the theory in the proem of Parmenides’ poem (B1), consists of two main parts, preceded by an 
introduction providing the context of the proem. The first subchapter (1.1) will discuss the circular 
objects in the proem: the chariot’s wheels and the turning axle-posts of the gates. I shall argue 
that the circularity here employed reflects on the compositional unity of the poem and the 
principal unity of the ἀλήθεια in contrast to the cosmological plurality of the δόξαι. Comprising 
duality (two wheels, two doors) and unity (one chariot, one gate) at the same time, the circular 
objects of the poem do not figure the theory of the proem (since the proem does not contain its 
own philosophical theory), but the theory of Parmenides as a whole, since (a) it reflects on the 
theme of unity versus plurality which runs throughout the whole poem and (b) it reflects on the 
unity of the compositional parts of Parmenides’ poem. The second subchapter (1.2) will examine 
the topography of the described journey. I will argue that the ringcomposition figures the circular 
journey and establishes the underworld as the location of the revelation. The circular nature of 
the journey is reinforced by the circular narrative form, which figures the topography of the 
journey and the location of the goddess. 
 The proem, in which the κοῦρος is brought to the revealing goddess, describes this 
chariot journey, guided by mares and maidens, later made clear to be the daughters of the Sun. 
It starts with a technical description of the axle of the chariot’s wheels and the sound it makes. 
The daughters of the Sun have left the house of Night and pull back their veils. The exact 
direction of the journey they made is contested, as I will dilate upon in the second main part of 
this chapter. It is undisputed that the journey goes through the ‘gates of the paths of Night and 
Day’.24 These gates, resembling the house of Night in Hesiod’s Theogony 736-766,25 are 
guarded by Dike, who is persuaded by the daughters of the Sun to let the κοῦρος pass. After 
another technical description of how the doors open, the κοῦρος is carried further on the path, 
where he meets the goddess, the narrator shifting from the κοῦρος to her in order to reveal her 
knowledge. 
 There have been two main ways in which scholars have tried to illuminate the meaning of 
this proem: examining the intertextual borrowings from Homer, Hesiod, and others, and reading 
the poem as an allegory.26  
The proem is clearly richly embedded in other literature, which caused scholars to 
assume many different subtexts.27 Although such parallels can be illuminating and can help us to 
understand the context Parmenides’ proem should be read in, many semantic associations 
helping to shape the meaning of a word have been lost, so it is intrinsically impossible for us to 
                                                          
24 ἔνθα πύλαι νυκτός τε καὶ ἤματός εἰσι κελεύθων (B1.11). 
25 Bollack (2006) 78. For the similarities and differences between Hesiod’s house of Night and 
Parmenides’ gates of the roads of Night and Day, see Bowra (1953) 44 and Robbiano (2005) 185-188. 
26 Most (1999) 354. 
27 Diels (1897) 12-21 accounts for an Orphic subtext; Bowra (1953) 44-46 sees the journey of Phaeton 
and the ascension of Heracles as subtexts; Fränkel (1955) 158 compares the chariot to the one in 
Pindar’s Olympian Ode 6.22-27; Havelock (1958) 136-140 examines the intertextuality with Homer’s 
Odyssey; Coxon (1986) 9-11 gives a list of Parmenides’ main debts to Homer. 
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grasp its full sense.28 This caveat, however, does not mean that we should stop searching for 
subtexts and discussing their meaning. 
 The most important way in which the proem is and has often been read, on the other 
hand, is as an allegory. There are several allegorical readings possible, but there are two main 
ones: of light as knowledge and of the κοῦρος as a religious cult-initiate. Since ancient times the 
proem has been seen as an allegory for a journey towards knowledge,29 in which darkness and 
light would symbolize respectively ignorance and knowledge, and the gates the κοῦρος goes 
through would stand for the obstacles between men and the truth.30 The most influential in 
establishing this allegory in modern times has been Bowra, giving an extensive overview of the 
meaning of the elements of the proem.31 The second possibility of the object of allegorical 
reference is the account of a religious initiation, mainly because of the phrase εἰδότα φῶτα, ‘the 
man who knows’.32 The κοῦρος could thus be seen as described with the words that one 
normally would use to describe an initiate of a religious sect.33 Although this phrase may have 
evoked these associations with his hearers and readers, Parmenides meant something slightly 
different by it, namely ‘the awareness that reality cannot be known through the senses’.34  
Partly because it is unclear whether the device of allegory was so far developed in 
Parmenides’ time,35 the tendency in scholarship has shifted from treating this proem as a full-
blown allegory (being either of light as knowledge or of the κοῦρος as a religious cult-initiate) to 
seeing it in terms of ‘metaphor’ and ‘image’,36 or to treating allegory as a possibility, but only one 
out of many.37 
 
1.1 Circular objects in the proem 
 
 The proem contains two circular objects: the wheels of the chariot and the opening gates. 
Described in a high level of detail, when compared to other descriptions of these objects in 
archaic literature, they reflect on the metapoetical unity of the poem and the cosmological issue 
of unity versus plurality. The wheels of the chariot, the first circular object to appear in the 
proem, are described as follows: 
 
ἄξων δ’ ἐν χνοίῃσιν ἵ<ει> σύριγγος ἀυτήν  
αἰθόμενος, δοιοῖς γὰρ ἐπείγετο δινωτοῖσιν 
κύκλοις ἀμφοτέρωθεν (B1.6-8)38 
                                                          
28 Burkert (1969) 2-3. 
29 Waterfield (2000) 49-50. As far as we know, the first to read the proem allegorically is the sceptic 
philosopher Sextus Empiricus from the 2nd/3rd century AD (Granger (2008) 4). 
30 Coxon (1986) 13. 
31 Bowra (1953) 39-40. 
32 B1.3. 
33 Bowra (1953) 50-51. 
34 Coxon (1986) 159. 
35 Bowra (1953) 40 obviously thinks that it was, stating that the allegory became more widespread in the 
sixth century BC and that it also came in use outside mythology, but Gemelli Marciano (2008) 27 denies 
that a full-blown allegory already existed at the time. 
36 Granger (2008) 4. 
37 Robbiano (2005) 18. 
38 αὐτήν] Coxon ἀυτὴν. 
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The axle in the naves sent forth the whistle of a pipe,  
burning,39 for it was urged forward by two whirling wheels 
on either side. 
 
 There are three noteworthy elements in these lines I shall examine closer: the whistle of 
a pipe, the overheating of the axle and the mentioning of the wheels. First of all, the shrill noise 
that the axle makes when the hubs press on it, is part of a stock description of rapid chariot 
movement in epic.40 A good example of this element of sound in another chariot description is to 
be found in the chariot race depicted on Heracles’ shield: 
 
 ἐπὶ δὲ πλῆμναι μέγ’ ἀύτευν. (Hesiod, Shield of Heracles 309)41 
 
And the naves of the wheels shrieked heavily. 
 
The sound made by the chariot is in both passages described by a word from the same 
root: respectively ἀυτή and ἀυτέω. In Parmenides’ description, the mentioning of this noise is 
especially striking, since it is the first sound depicted in the proem. In fact, when we exclude the 
speech of the goddess, only one other sound is described: the speech of the daughters of the 
Sun persuading Dike to let the κοῦρος pass (‘with soft words’).42 The mentioning of the shriek is 
an element which places the proem in a realistic, physical context.  
Another element functioning likewise, is the word αἰθόμενος (‘burning’), referring to the 
overheating of the axle. As Coxon already noted, this is founded on a physical fact: the axle of 
fast-moving chariots makes a shrieking noise and cannot get rid of its heat.43 
After the reference to the thermal condition of the axle, it is said to be urged forward by 
two whirling wheels on either side, a statement Mourelatos argues to be quite superfluous.44 He 
points to its motive as a precedent in Homer’s description of Hera’s chariot:45 
 
πλῆμναι δ’ ἀργύρου εἰσὶ περίδρομοι ἀμφοτέρωθεν˙ 
δίφρος δὲ χρυσέοισι καὶ ἀργυρέοισιν ἱμᾶσιν 
ἐντέταται, δοιαὶ δὲ περίδρομοι ἄντυγές εἰσι. (Homer, Iliad 5.726-728)46 
 
And the naves of the wheels are of silver, running round on either side: 
and the chariot-board is hung on tight-stretched straps of gold and silver, 
and there are two round rails running round. 
                                                          
39 According to Coxon (1986) 160 αἰθόμενος in this passage means ‘burning’, not ‘glowing’. 
40 Mourelatos (2008) 12-13. 
41 Text Russo (1950) 155. 
42 μαλακοῖσι λόγοισι (B1.15). 
43 Coxon (1986) 160. 
44 Mourelatos (2008) 13: ‘From the point of view of narration the statement is quite superfluous: the 
introductory γάρ makes this elaboration of the obvious even a bit pompous.’ 
45 Wright (1997) 8-9 also compares the two passages, seeing a parallel in the haste. In the Iliad, Hera and 
Athena namely rush to the Olympus to consult Zeus, and in Parmenides the daughters of the Sun speed 
the κοῦρος towards the goddess. 
46 Text Allen (1931) 153. 
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Although this is indeed a parallel to the motive,47 Mourelatos in my opinion does not 
entirely grasp Parmenides’ aim in mentioning the two wheels, since he grants importance neither 
to the level of detail they are described in nor to their duality, which I shall now argue to be 
significant elements in unravelling interpretative possibilities. 
As said before, the highly detailed description of the chariot is full of realistic elements: 
the shriek and the overheating. These realistic images, known to the audience from their daily 
life, have the effect of stressing that the κοῦρος comes from their own world. Since in that sense 
he does not differ so much from them, he becomes more relatable for the audience, which is an 
excellent way of drawing the audience into the text.48  
Those realistic elements are also the signal to regard the chariot as a theoretical object: 
the level of described details functions as a signifier that the text not only presents, but 
represents something. The chariot is more often described in literature,49 but Parmenides 
describes it ostensively with a level of details not taken into account by the other poets. By 
polemically putting himself apart from his predecessors, he signals with this precision that 
different layers of meaning are hidden behind the surface. The chariot is a theoretical object in 
the sense that it demonstrates two different modes of internal reflectivity, which ultimately need a 
figure like this to be realized, since they entail a level of subtlety which could not have been 
expressed in a logical step-by-step argumentation. 
The first mode of reflectivity the chariot entails is the metapoetical dimension. Although 
the chariot had been used already as an allegory for song before,50 Parmenides adds an extra 
layer: the chariot not only stands for the poem as a whole, but the detail of the two wheels, 
judged by Mourelatos to be superfluous, also represents the two parts of the revelation. Just as 
the two wheels are parts of the chariot as a whole, the ἀλήθεια and the δόξαι are parts of the 
overarching poem. Already in this metapoetical dimension the unease of the junction of these 
two parts of the revelation (since they contradict each other) comes to light: the joining literally 
causes friction, symbolized in the description by the shrieking noise that the axle brings forth. In 
spite of this friction, the chariot nevertheless is able to fulfil its function and move the κοῦρος 
forward, just as the poem becomes a whole despite the junction that is difficult to explain. 
                                                          
47 Another parallel which is often made is Pindar’s Olympian Odes 6.22-27. The point of comparison is the 
metapoetical role that the chariot fulfills. Bowra (1953) 41-43 works out the exact parallels between these 
two passages: both the chariots can be seen as metapoetical and go through open gates. Both attribute 
wisdom to their animals and two phrases strongly resemble each other. Since Pindar and Parmenides 
were more or less contemporaries, it is possible that Pindar’s source was Parmenides or the other way 
around, but it is more likely that they both drew on a common source (Granger (2008) 7). Because 
Pindar’s imagery is closely connected to its encomiastic context (Gemelli Marciano (2008) 28), the only 
information this parallel provides about Parmenides deals with either Parmenides’ reception or 
Parmenides’ lost source, neither of which is relevant for my current purpose. 
48 Three other elements functioning to let the audience identify with the κοῦρος are, as Robbiano (2005) 
70-73 argued, the fact that the κοῦρος is described as ‘the man who knows’ (εἰδότα φῶτα, B1.3), which is 
desirable, the fact that he is the focaliser, and the fact that he is described in positive terms. Furthermore, 
it is made easier for the audience to relate to the κοῦρος because they have a comparable amount of 
wisdom at the start of the poem. 
49 E.g. Theognis 249-250; Bacchylides 5.176-178; Pindar Olympian Ode 9.82; see Bowra (1953) 41-42 for 
an extensive list. 
50 See footnote 49. 
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The second mode of reflectivity of the chariot as a theoretical object is the cosmological 
reflectivity: the chariot consists of two wheels, but nevertheless also can be seen as one single 
chariot. As Morgan already noted, the duality can be said to be introduced in the proem in order 
to provide a literary model for the progress of the poem.51 The proem still reflects the 
phenomenal world, in which the audience finds itself before becoming initiated, together with the 
κοῦρος, in the knowledge of the ἀλήθεια.52 This phenomenal world, just like the δόξαι, contains 
plurality. The duality in the proem already foreshadows the cosmological duality in the δόξαι, 
since there the two cosmogonical principles Fire and Night are introduced. The fact that the 
proem foreshadows the δόξαι in this sense should, however, not be seen as an argument to 
state that the δόξαι are true, but rather the opposite. Since the δόξαι are said to be deceptive,53 
the fact that the proem also contains this plurality rather implies that the κοῦρος (and the 
audience along with him) is still in the mindset of the mortals, who believe in plurality. From the 
viewpoint of the κοῦρος at the start of the poem, there is plurality in the world, but he will soon 
find out (by hearing the ἀλήθεια from the goddess) that this is the wrong way of looking at it. 
In the world the κοῦρος finds himself in during the proem, there is duality: the chariot 
which carries him contains two wheels. The knowledge of the ἀλήθεια, directly following the 
proem, does no longer acknowledge plurality, but only recognizes unity. The cosmological 
reflectivity of the chariot functions as a didactic tool for the audience, since by learning the 
ἀλήθεια, one receives the tools to rethink the proem and can then come to the conclusion that 
although at the time there seemed to be duality (since there were two wheels), one now has the 
insight that only the unity matters (the fact that there is only one chariot). The chariot thus 
becomes an image of how the κοῦρος (and with him the audience) progress in knowledge: first it 
seemed as if there were two wheels, but now the way in which they together form a unity is 
striking. The ἀλήθεια thus offers the audience the possibility to reflect on the duality in the 
wheels and rethink it to be a unity. 
The chariot through its internal reflectivity thus functions as a symbol of both the unity of 
ἀλήθεια and δόξαι in the same poem and the way in which duality can be rethought as unity. 
Both modes of reflectivity are based on the relation of the two wheels to the single chariot, and 
are signalled by the high level of details the description contains by which Parmenides 
polemically sets himself apart from other chariot descriptions. 
 There is one other circular object in the proem: the opening doors of the gate. Right after 
the description of the gates, the keys of which54 Dike is said to hold, the daughters of the Sun try 
to persuade Dike to open the gates for the κοῦρος as follows: 
 
                                                          
51 Morgan (2000) 80. 
52 Cf. Deichgräber (1959) 11. 
53 E.g. in B1.30: ‘the opinions of mortals, which comprise no genuine conviction’; cf. subchapter 3.1. 
54 It remains unclear why there is more than one key. I fully agree with Mansfeld (1964) 241 that a poetic 
plural in such a technical passage seems unlikely. Diels (1897) 51 argued that Parmenides described a 
Laconian lock, in which a number of βάλανοι (pins) would be lifted by a single key (for illustrations of this 
lock, see Diels (1897) 141-145). This, however, does not explain the several keys, nor is it certain that the 
Laconian lock already existed in Parmenides’ time (Coxon (1986) 164). According to Coxon (ibidem), a 
door functioned in such a way that one key per βάλανος was required, and since βαλανωτὸν ὀχῆα makes 
clear that these gates only have one βάλανος, he concludes that Parmenides ‘is concerned to emphasize 
the impregnability of the divine realm’. This, however, still does not explain the inconsistency in this further 
accurate description.  
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τὴν δὴ [...] κοῦραι [...] 
πεῖσαν ἐπιφραδέως, ὥς σφιν βαλανωτὸν ὀχῆα 
ἀπτερέως ὤσειε πυλέων ἄπο˙  ταὶ δὲ θυρέτρων 
χάσμ’ ἀχανὲς ποίησαν ἀναπτάμεναι πολυχάλκους 
ἄξονας ἐν σύριγξιν ἀμοιβαδὸν εἰλίξασαι 
γόμφοις καὶ περόνῃσιν ἀρηρότε (B1.15-20) 
 
Her the maidens […] 
carefully persuaded to swiftly push back the bar, fastened with a bolt-pin, 
for them from the gates: and when the gates had flown open,  
they created a yawning gap in the door frame,  
as they had caused the bronze axle-posts, fixed with bolts and pins, 
to turn successively in their sockets. 
 
This is the second passage in which Parmenides gives a highly detailed and technical 
description. The bronze axle-posts (πολυχάλκους ἄξονας) turned in their sockets (ἐν σύριγξιν), 
which were sunk in the threshold and probably also metal-lined.55 This circular movement, of 
which the axle-posts form the centre, is also characterized by duality: there are two doors. In 
contrast to the chariot wheels, who made the same movement at the same time, the doors open 
one after the other (ἀμοιβαδόν). 
This passage thus resembles the previously discussed one about the wheels in multiple 
ways. Both passages entail circularity (in the roundness of the wheels and in the movement of 
the axle-posts) and duality (two wheels and two axle-posts). They both contain a high level of 
detail connected to daily experiences of the audience. Furthermore, the language recalls the 
earlier passage: the word σύριγξ is used in both contexts, albeit in a slightly different meaning 
(‘pipe’ vs. ‘door socket’).56 These passages are thus closely connected, but how should this be 
interpreted? 
In my opinion, the references of this passage to the description of the chariot wheels are 
the signal that the audience should look for the layers beyond this description as well. The close 
connection between the two passages invites to examine their interconnection and is the signal 
that these gates also should be considered as a theoretical object. The result of the examination 
to their interconnection is that the gates contain the same two reflective layers as the chariot did: 
the two passages are connected in every possible way.  
The gates entail the same cosmological reflectivity: the depicted object carries at the 
same time a duality (two doors) and a unity (one gate). As described above, they thus form a 
didactic tool for the audience, who at the beginning notices the duality but with the unfolding of 
the poem receives the needed information to regard it as a unity.  
Although less obvious than the cosmological reflectivity, the gates also contain the 
metapoetical mode of reflectivity. The description of the chariot, where the metapoetical layer is 
absolutely undisputed because of the tradition already attributing that meaning to chariots in 
poetry, is clearly invoked in the mind of the audience in the description of the gates. Because of 
the strong references (level of detail, lexical reference of σύριγξ, thematical reference of 
                                                          
55 Coxon (1986) 165. 
56 Morgan (2000) 76. 
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circularity) and mainly because of the fact that this passage contains the same elements of a 
duality nevertheless being contained within a unity, the gates also can be seen as reflecting on 
the way in which the revelations of the ἀλήθεια and the δόξαι are part of the same poem. 
Although at first sight these two compositional parts may seem to contradict and to fit in badly 
with each other, they nevertheless form a unity, in the same way in which the gates together 
form the unity of the door.  
Through its references to the description of the chariot, the gates share the chariot’s 
metapoetical and cosmological reflectivity. Besides functioning as a tool to draw the audience 
into the text by the fairly large amount of details, the gates thus figure the theory of the poem as 
a whole. Whereas I shall argue that circularity in the ἀλήθεια and δόξαι mainly figures the 
doctrine of its own compositional section (and at most the theory of the other part by polemic 
contrast), the gates and the chariot reflect on the relation between unity and plurality (for more 
information, see subchapter 3.1) which runs through the entire poem as a leitmotiv. Furthermore, 
it also figures Parmenides’ theory, because it reflects on the way his poem remains a whole, 
despite its fairly contrasting components. 
 
1.2 Circular topography of the journey 
 
 The topography of the journey made by the daughters of the Sun and the κοῦρος 
belongs to the most heavily debated topics in Parmenidean scholarship. The question is whether 
the κοῦρος is brought in the chariot to the house of Night or to the light. Where can we locate the 
goddess and where did the revelation take place? Or is the topography so blurred that it 
becomes impossible to pin it down? I will argue that the ringcomposition shaping the proem 
helps us in establishing the journey as circular, which places the revelation in the darkness. 
Circularity is in this case employed not as a notion of content, but as one of form. As such, the 
ringcomposition which encompasses the circularity also establishes a circular event (the 
journey), thus reinforcing its own circular shape. The narrative form of ringcomposition in the 
proem figures the course of events (the circular journey) in the sense that it deictically 
demonstrates it by resembling its circularity. The audience thus learns of the location of the 
goddess in the darkness (an important characteristic of Parmenides’ theory, since the theme of 
darkness and night is omnipresent in the poem, both as the setting against which the proem 
unfolds itself and as a cosmogonical principle in the δόξαι) through the circular journey which is 
reinforced by the circular narrative structure of the poem. The ringcomposition and the journey 
therefore have a didactic purpose in figuring this element of Parmenides’ theory: they are meant 
to educate the audience on the location of the goddess. 
The unclarity about the direction of the journey is caused by the indeterminacy of 
Parmenides’ syntax in the following key clause:57 
 
[…] ὅτε σπερχοίατο πέμπειν 
ἡλιάδες κοῦραι, προλιποῦσαι δώματα νυκτός  
εἰς φάος, ὡσάμεναι κράτων ἄπο χερσὶ καλύπτρας. (B1.8-10)58 
 
                                                          
57 Miller (2006) 20. 
58 κοῦραι,] Coxon κοῦραι (without comma). 
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when the daughters of the Sun made haste to escort me, 
having left the house of Night for the light, 
after they had thrust the veils from their heads with their hands. 
 
 The direction of the journey depends on whether one constructs εἰς φάος with the finite 
verb σπερχοίατο πέμπειν (‘made haste to escort me towards the light’) or with the immediately 
preceding participial clause προλιποῦσαι δώματα Νυκτός (‘having left the house of Night to go 
towards the light’).59 
 The former construction was the communis opinio in the first half of the twentieth century. 
The editors Diels and Tarán placed προλιποῦσαι δώματα Νυκτός between commas, arguing 
that the κοῦρος was taken by the daughters of the Sun into the light, where he received the 
revelation of the goddess.60 Several arguments can be given for this position. First of all, it is 
convenient in the reading of the proem as an allegory, in which light stands for knowledge and 
darkness for ignorance (i).61 When one wishes to maintain this allegory, the goddess, and 
therefore the destination of the κοῦρος, needs to be located in the light. It is not implausible to 
assume these metaphors, since the same imagery can be found in Pindar.62  
Secondly, the leading powers of the journey are the daughters of the Sun (ii). Thus it 
appears natural for the journey to lead towards the heaven.63 Furthermore, as soon as they 
reach the light, these daughters of the Sun thrust the veils from their heads (B1.10), which could 
be interpreted as their being at home in the light (iii).64 Besides, the gates of Night and Day are 
characterized as ‘ethereal’ (αἰθέριαι, B1.13),65 and even have the connotation of the doors of 
heaven,66 so they are located high up in the sky (iv). The discussion of the connotation of the 
‘yawning chasm’ (χάσμ’ ἀχανές, B1.18) which the gates create in the doorframe has also been 
used to defend the position that the revelation took place in the night (v). Although the Hesiodic 
resonance of χάσμα points towards a gap beneath, the word is later used to express an open 
space above, which supports the idea of an ascension of the κοῦρος to the light.67 Finally, the 
phrase Parmenides employed to designate the chariot going through the gates, ‘there then 
through them’ (τῇ ῥα δι’ αὐτέων, B1.20), closely resembles the one employed by Homer to 
describe the course of Hera’s chariot through the ‘gates of heaven’ in her upwards journey to 
Zeus (τῇ ῥα δι’ αὐτάων, Iliad 5.752)(vi).68 
                                                          
59 Unfortunately neither punctuation, which is added only later, nor meter can solve this problem, since in 
the stichic meter of the dactylic hexameter a pause at the end of each line is normal, the line being the 
determining unit, which does not help to construct the syntax (Miller (2006) 20 n.33). 
60 Diels (1897) 31; Tarán (1965) 7. The same conclusion is drawn by Bowra (1953) 43-44 and 
Deichgräber (1959) 11. 
61 Bowra (1953) 39; Mourelatos (2008) 15. 
62 For these metaphors in Pindar, see Bowra (1953) 40-41. 
63 Fränkel (1955) 161; Miller (2006) 19; Mourelatos (2008) 14-15. 
64 Fränkel (1955) 161; Miller (2006) 19. 
65 Miller (2006) 19. 
66 For in Iliad 5.749ff. the doors of heaven are guarded by the Hours/Seasons, to which Dike according to 
Hesiod, Theogony 902ff. belongs (Mourelatos (2008) 15). 
67 For an extensive discussion of the connotations of this word, see Miller (2006) 21-22. The later use is 
manifested among others in a now lost play by Sophocles and an instance of the 2nd/3rd century AD. 
68 Granger (2008) 11-12. The sole difference is the dialect (Miller (2006) 19). 
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Morrison (1955) was the first to oppose this thesis that the revelation took place in the 
light, replacing it by the hypothesis that it took place in the darkness.69 Although Burkert (1969) 
supported this night hypothesis with more founded arguments, it was ignored by the English-
speaking world until the article of Furley (1973). Afterwards it has been commonly accepted 
among editors and translators.70  
Many arguments have been given for this position. The first and foremost argument is 
that the word-order makes it more natural to read εἰς φάος with the immediately preceding 
participial clause προλιποῦσαι δώματα Νυκτός than with the finite verb σπερχοίατο πέμπειν that 
stands at a larger distance (a).71 The elliptical construction λιπεῖν...εἰς is well-attested,72 so this 
reading is highly plausible. Furthermore, tradition places the daughters of the Sun in the 
underworld, since that was the daily birthplace of the Sun (b).73 This negates the argument (ii) of 
the light-hypothesis, because the daughters of the Sun were thus not only associated with the 
sky, being the daughters of the sun god Helios, but also, and perhaps even stronger, with the 
underworld. This makes it probable that they took the κοῦρος to their home. Argument (iii) (the 
throwing of the veils signifying that they feel at home in the light) can also be discarded, since 
ὡσάμεναι (B1.10) is a aorist participle, therefore describing a completed action (c). The 
daughters of the Sun already had thrown their veils from their heads while they were still in the 
house of Night, which could reflect that they are at home there (as already argued as well in 
argument (b)).74 
Another reason to assume the revelation took place in the dark is the reassurance that 
the goddess gives to the κοῦρος in B1.26: it was not ‘an ill fate’ (μοῖρα κακή) that brought him to 
her (d). This phrase was commonly used to designate ‘death’.75 The fact that the goddess says 
that the road to her is normally only travelled by the deceased, means that she is located at the 
place where the deceased travel to: the darkness of the underworld. Argument (e) is the 
counterargument of (v): although χάσμα in the later tradition came to indicate an open space 
above, it also echoes the ‘huge chasm’ (χάσμα μέγ’) of the Tartarus from Theogony 740.76 Since 
we cannot prove that χάσμα already had the later meaning at the time of Parmenides, it seems 
more plausible to me that the association of χάσμα with the underworld played a role here, 
because we can prove that association (Hesiod was widely known at the time of Parmenides 
and Parmenides frequently alludes to him).  
                                                          
69 He named the journey to the underworld a κατάβασις, to which he offered the parallel of Odysseus, who 
went to the underworld to receive instruction (Morrison (1955) 60). The element of κατάβασις was soon 
removed from the night hypothesis by Burkert (1969) 15. 
70 The thesis that the revelation took place in the dark, so that εἰς φάος belongs to προλιποῦσαι δώματα 
Νυκτός, is followed by e.g. Mansfeld (1964) 234; Kirk, Raven, and Schofield (1983) 243; Coxon (1986) 44-
45; Sassi (1988) 386; Sedley (1999) 124; Waterfield (2000) 57; Morgan (2000) 73; Miller (2006) 12-13; 
Bollack (2006) 75-76; Primavesi (2013) 54. 
71 Among others Mansfeld (1964) 238; Burkert (1969) 7; Furley (1973) 1-2; Coxon (1986) 160-161; 
Robbiano (2005) 162 n.34; Granger (2008) 11. 
72 For examples see Mansfeld (1964) 238 and Furley (1973) 1-2. 
73 Waterfield (2000) 49. See Morrison (1955) 60 for instances in Homer, Stesichorus, and Mimnermus. 
74 Miller (2006) 20-21. The fact that the veiled deities in Hesiod are the Heliconian Muses, associated with 
nighttime (Hesiod, Theogony 9-10), supports the claim that the darkness of the underworld is their home; 
cf. Granger (2008) 12. 
75 This phrase is also used by Homer to describe the death of Nisander in Iliad 13.602 (Coxon (1986) 10). 
76 Cf. footnote 67. 
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The fact that the horses carrying the κοῦρος are mares is highly significant, because we 
barely have parallels to the use of mares in literature of Parmenides’ time (with the exception of 
their use in races) (f). The only significant parallel is the Hymn to Demeter, where mares carry 
the chariot bringing Persephone to the underworld.77 The feminine nature of the horses therefore 
also points to a journey to the darkness. Furthermore, Primavesi argued for an analogy between 
the path of night and day before the gate and the house of Night on the one hand and the 
ἀλήθεια and the δόξαι on the other hand (g).78 In order for the proem to form a literary analogy to 
the internal relation of the following two parts, in the sense that the ἀλήθεια and δόξαι entail the 
same ternary structure as the topography of night and day in the proem, 79 the daughters of the 
Sun need to come from the house of Night to the light, pick the κοῦρος up there and take him 
through the gates of night and day to the house of Night. This argument receives its strength 
from the fact that it is based on Parmenides’ text itself rather than speculative intertexts. Finally, 
the adjective ‘severely punishing’ (πολύποινος, B1.14) suggests an infernal nature for Dike, 
which pleads for the location of the gates at the access to the underworld (h).80 
It may be clear that many arguments can be and have been given for both sides. I 
strongly agree with the night-hypothesis, stating that the daughters of the Sun brought the 
κοῦρος through the gates to the house of Night, where the revelation took place. I do not wish to 
deny that there are elements of the imagery of light and heaven in the proem (the gates are still 
called ‘ethereal’ and the description of going through the gates does indeed resemble Hera’s 
upgoing chariot)81, but I deny both that this means that the revelation took place in the light and 
that it suggests that the topography of the journey is (intentionally or unintentionally) unclear.82 
As appears from the strong arguments above, it is clear that the revelation took place in the 
dark, but I argue that Parmenides intentionally also introduced elements of light in the proem in 
order to make it resemble the world of the δόξαι. Just as the circular elements in the proem, that 
all appear in twofold, resemble the duality of the δόξαι (since the κοῦρος is not yet initiated with 
the knowledge of the ἀλήθεια), the two elements of Fire (i.e. Light) and Night which occupy a 
central position in the δόξαι are resembled in the proem. This way, the proem makes clear on a 
literary level that the transmission of knowledge still needs to take place. This, however, does 
not detract from the fact that the revelation took place in the dark. 
A highly important and potentially decisive argument can, however, be added to the ones 
given above. The fact is that all these other arguments in favour of the night hypothesis are 
                                                          
77 Gemelli Marciano (2008) 29, who concludes that the parallel of the Hymn to Demeter illuminates two 
inseparable levels in Parmenides: the divine plan and the willing cooperation of the κοῦρος. 
78 Primavesi (2013) 45-46. 
79 The analogy consists in the fact that before the gates, night and day alternate, whereas behind the 
gates there is only night. The ἀλήθεια also knows such a ternary structure: there are the roads of Being 
and Not-Being, which alternate in the world of the δόξαι, although in the ἀλήθεια only one of these actually 
is, which is the road of Being. 
80 Mourelatos (2008) 15. 
81 The other arguments of the light-hypothesis have already been rejected: the arguments (ii), (iii), and (v) 
respectively by arguments (b), (c), and (e) of the night-hypothesis and argument (i) since reading the 
proem as an allegory is nowadays regarded as only one of the possible options, which is certainly not 
strong enough to carry the whole interpretation that the revelation took place in the light. 
82 Fränkel (1955) 161; Curd (1998) 18; Granger (2008) 12 argue that the topography of the journey is 
unclear, so that it would be a mistake to choose. Suggesting that the blur might be intentional are Morgan 
(2000) 78; Miller (2006) 20-23; Mourelatos (2008) 15. 
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based on syntax, the relation with the other parts of the poem, and the relation to other texts. 
The formal structure, however, offers a powerful argument in favour of the revelation in the night. 
Martin Steinrück, who examined the formal structure of the proem, strangely enough failed to 
see its potential in solving the difficulty of the direction of the journey. I intend to fill this gap with 
this subchapter. 
Steinrück identified two ringcompositions in Parmenides’ proem. The first 
ringcomposition manifests itself in the first four verses of B1,83 and is taken up in the second, 
larger ringcomposition that covers B1.1-26. It is the latter ringcomposition that concerns me 
here. According to Steinrück, the proem consists of a ringcomposition that contains six layers: 
 
A: lines 1-2 (echoed keywords ἵπποι ταί με φέρουσιν ... ἱκάνοι) 
  B: lines 3-4 (echoed keyword δαίμονες) 
   C: line 5 (echoed keyword ἅρμα) 
    D: lines 6-8 (echoed keywords ἄξων ... σύριγγος) 
     E: lines 9-10 (echoed keywords κοῦραι ... ὠσάμεναι...ἄπο) 
      F: lines 11-12 (no echoed keywords) 
      F’: lines 13-14 (no echoed keywords) 
     E’: lines  15-18 (echoed keywords κοῦραι...ὤσειε...ἄπο) 
    D’: lines 19-20 (echoed keywords ἄξονας ... σύριγξιν) 
   C’: line 21 (echoed keyword ἅρμα) 
  B’: lines 22-23 (echoed keyword θεά) 
A’: lines 24-26 (echoed keywords ἵπποις ταί σε φέρουσιν ἱκάνων)84 
 
 Every single layer thus concerns certain themes and keywords that are echoed or 
repeated in the layer which closes that ring off. The centre of the ringcomposition is formed by 
the description of the gate.  
I propose that the ringcomposition echoes the journey undertaken by the daughters of 
the Sun (so not by the κοῦρος): they start from the house of Night and move towards the light 
(εἰς φάος). They then pick up the κοῦρος and with him on board the chariot goes through the 
gates and back to the house of Night, where the revealing goddess awaits its arrival. The 
journey of the daughters of the Sun is thus circular and the house of Night is both their starting 
point and finish. The turning point is formed by the gates of the paths of Day and Night, which 
also form the turning point and centre of the ringcomposition.  
It is not unimaginable that, like in the case of Homer’s Shield of Achilles,85 the narrative 
construction reflects on the content it encompasses, in this case the journey of the daughters of 
the Sun. Their circular journey, already supported by so many arguments that favour the 
revelation in the night, would then also be reflected in the narrative arranging principle of its 
description. The ringcomposition here thus is what I described in the introduction to be a 
figurative ringcomposition: it not only structures the content, but this very content is reinforced 
through its figuration in the shape of the composition. This figurative composition has a 
characteristic deictic nature that manifests itself in two ways. Firstly, it directs the attention to the 
                                                          
83 Steinrück (2005) 19. 
84 Simplified version. For the full version with more details, see Steinrück (2005) 20. 
85 Cf. footnote 22. 
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centre of the ringcomposition: the gates. Secondly and perhaps even more importantly, it points 
towards the function of its own structure in the narrative: instead of being a mere structural 
device, it adds meaning and functions as a sign that it represents the circular direction of the 
journey of the daughters of the Sun.  
To conclude, the figurative ringcomposition of the proem has a didactic purpose in 
educating the audience about the direction of the journey and the location of the goddess, which 
it fulfils by figuring the content in its form. 
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Chapter 2: Circularity as figuring concept in the ἀλήθεια 
 
 At the end of the proem, the goddess announces what knowledge she will convey to the 
κοῦρος: the truth and the false opinions of mortals. The former account is fragmentarily 
transmitted under fragments B2-B8. In this chapter, I will examine how circularity is employed in 
these fragments of the ἀλήθεια in order to figure and shape Parmenides’ theory of truth.  
This chapter contains three parts shedding light on the ways in which three instances of 
circularity figure his doctrine. In the first section (2.1), I shall discuss the two textual variants 
‘persuasive’ and ‘well-rounded’ truth in B1.29 and argue why the former is to be preferred. 
Although ‘persuasive’ truth itself does not figure Parmenides’ theory, it is important to discuss 
this issue, since ‘well-rounded’ truth could have been an apt way for Parmenides to help his 
audience to grasp the abstract notion of truth by visualizing it. For a correct understanding of 
Parmenides it is vital to recognize the error in reasoning lying at the basis of the variant ‘well-
rounded’ and to realize why Parmenides chose not to figure his theory by attributing circularity to 
truth. 
The second part (2.2) will maintain that the image of a circle is presented to reflect on the 
discourse (B5). Adding circularity to the widespread poetological motif of the road for the 
unfolding of the discourse, Parmenides uses circularity to quite literally shape the theory, since 
the shape of a circle reflects on the discourse always coming back to the same key element of 
his doctrine. Circularity here thus figures the theory because it reflects on the shape of the 
discourse in which the theory is communicated, stressing one of its main premises. 
The third section of this chapter (2.3) will examine how the comparison of Being to a well-
rounded ball (B8.42-49) contributes to a better understanding of Being. Taking as the point of 
comparison the homogeneity and completeness of the well-rounded ball instead of its circular 
shape, I shall demonstrate how both the content and the form of this comparison figure an 
important aspect of Parmenides’ theory: it didactically presents the audience with a visual tool to 
memorize relevant characteristics of Being: completeness and homogeneity. The comparison 
with this spherical object both helps the audience to process these features and reflects on the 
very essence of Being. 
 
2.1 Persuasive truth 
 
 The very first thing that the κοῦρος hears about truth is the following announcement of 
the goddess: 
 
[...] χρεὼ δέ σε πάντα πυθέσθαι, 
ἠμὲν ἀληθείης εὐπειθέος ἀτρεμὲς ἦτορ  
ἠδὲ βροτῶν δόξας, τῇς οὐκ ἔνι πίστις ἀληθής. (B1.28-30) 
 
You must be informed of everything, 
both of the unmoved heart of persuasive reality 
and of the beliefs of mortals, which comprise no genuine conviction. 
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 Our sources for these lines, however, are divided in the readings they present. The best-
attested form is certainly εὐπειθέος (‘persuasive’), given by Sextus, Plutarch, Diogenes, and 
Clement. Proclus reads εὐφεγγέος (‘brilliant/shining’) and Simplicius is the only authority for 
εὐκυκλέος (‘well-rounded’).86 εὐφεγγέος is rejected as an anachronism by all modern editors and 
commentators, since it derives from Proclus’ Neoplatonic reading of Parmenides.87 Scholars are, 
however, divided in their preference concerning the choice between εὐπειθέος and εὐκυκλέος. 
εὐπειθέος used to enjoy common acceptance, until Diels in 1897 argued for εὐκυκλέος, which 
then became the preferred form in the first half of the twentieth century. Since Jameson in 1958 
made out a case for εὐπειθέος again, commentators have been divided between the two 
readings until nowadays.88 
 In this subchapter I shall argue that εὐπειθέος is to be preferred and that εὐκυκλέος 
entered the tradition based on a misunderstanding of Parmenides’ comparison of Being to a ball 
at B8.42-49. Although the reading with εὐπειθέος does not contribute to the shaping of 
Parmenides’ theory, I nevertheless will discuss this issue, for the reading of ‘well-rounded’ truth, 
which I reject, could have been an apt way to figure Parmenides’ theory. One might say that the 
designation of truth as circular or spherical could have been a suitable didactic tool to help the 
audience, who only has a very abstract notion of truth, to understand it by attributing an adjective 
making it more visible and therefore easier to grasp. The qualifier ‘well-rounded’ could have 
been an apt way to figure Parmenides’ theory by making an element of it more visual.  
Why, then, should Parmenides not haven chosen to do so? The answer to this question 
is simple and straightforward: because truth was not well-rounded, circular, or spherical to him. 
Had he attributed well-roundedness to truth as a didactic tool for the audience, this would have 
countered everything he argues truth to be: the logical, rational delineation of arguments about 
Being. The textual variant εὐκυκλέος ended up in the textual transmission of B1.29 because of a 
common misconception of the comparison to a ‘well-rounded ball’ (εὐκύκλου σφαίρης, B8.43). 
As I shall argue in subchapter 2.3, when Parmenides compares Being to this ball, the point of 
comparison is the homogeneity and completeness, not the spherical shape. A group of scholars, 
however, has understood this comparison as asserting that Being is spherical and extended that 
sphericity even to truth. What are the arguments of the adherents of εὐκυκλέος in B1.29? 
 They first of all point at the authority of Simplicius: he possessed a good manuscript of 
Parmenides, which grants authority to his text readings.89 Furthermore, they claim that this 
reading is to be preferred because it is the lectio difficilior.90 The later philosophers did not 
understand the ‘perplexing’ εὐκυκλέος91 and therefore changed it into something that they did 
understand. εὐπειθέος thus could have entered the text as a gloss on εὐκυκλέος, since πίστις 
and ἀλήθεια are often connected to each other (in B1.30; B2.4; B8.28; B8.39; B8.50-51).92  
                                                          
86 Jameson (1958) 21-22. 
87 For this rejection, see e.g. Tarán (1965) 17; Bicknell (1979) 9. 
88 Preferring εὐκυκλέος are Diels (1897) 55; Reinhardt (1916) 5; Tarán (1965) 16-17; Ballew (1974) 191-
192; Kirk, Raven, and Schofield (1983) 242; Bollack (2006) 97-100; Wersinger (2008) 143; Palmer (2009) 
90 and 379; those who argue for εὐπειθέος are Jameson (1958) 21-26; Deichgräber (1959) 22; Bicknell 
(1979) 9-10; Coxon (1986) 51; Robbiano (2005) 60; Gemelli Marciano (2008) 36; Mourelatos (2008) 154-
158. 
89 See e.g. Bollack (2006) 100. 
90 Tarán (1965) 16. 
91 Palmer (2009) 379. 
92 Jameson (1958) 25-26. 
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This argument can, however, easily be subverted and turned around. Although Diels 
claimed that εὐκυκλέος is on the first view ‘formally and contentwise so offensive and shocking 
that it is psychologically just impossible to imagine the origin of such an interpolation,’93 I do think 
it is imaginable how εὐκυκλέος entered the tradition: ἀληθείης εὐκυκλέος closely resembles the 
comparison of Being to a well-rounded ball (εὐκύκλου σφαίρης, B8.43). As I shall demonstrate in 
subchapter 2.3, Being is rather compared to a ball in that passage than identified with it. The 
misinterpretation of this passage has, however, led some philosophers to the belief that Being is 
in fact spherical, which could have led to the emendation of the text of B1.29 to ἀληθείης 
εὐκυκλέος instead of the original ἀληθείης εὐπειθέος.94 
Another argument for εὐπειθέος is that it is well-attested.95 Sextus, Plutarch, Diogenes, 
and Clement all give this reading, whereas εὐκυκλέος is only found in Simplicius. Furthermore, 
the manuscripts of Sextus have the advantage over Simplicius’ that they quote B1 as a whole, 
instead of only the last few verses.96 Both the context of appearance and the frequency are 
favourable to εὐπειθέος. 
The case for εὐπειθέος is made even stronger by the connection between ἀλήθεια and 
πίστις that the poem often establishes, as mentioned above. Truth is convincing, whereas the 
δόξαι lack true conviction. The reason that the way of Being exercises this persuasion over us is 
that it is exhibited in a truthful and logical argumentation, opposed to the δόξαι which, even 
though logically presented, are not truthful and therefore cannot claim persuasion.97 
 Finally, the grammatical form εὐκυκλέος is unparalleled. It was chosen because of the 
hiatus that the normal form εὐκύκλου would yield.98 εὐκυκλέος is a hapax legomenon that is 
difficult to account for. Diels has tried to argue that the form is not strange, since there are more 
adjectives that have an ending in -ης as well as in -ος,99 but Jameson demonstrated that in these 
cases the form with ending -ης entailed a passive sense and the ones with -ος an active one.100 
It is thus hard to maintain that εὐκυκλέος was the original reading of B1.29 and that the 
conveyed meaning was the same as in the εὐκύκλου σφαίρης of B8.43. 
 The attributing of the adjective εὐκύκλου to ἀληθείης, concludingly, is based on a 
misunderstanding of the comparison in B8.42-49. In these lines, Being is not identified as 
spherical, but compared to a spherical object; the point of comparison not being its form but its 
homogeneity and completeness. Being is therefore not spherical, nor is truth, since it is the 
logical delineation of Being. Truth is, however, persuasive, so εὐπειθέος is the more probable 
textual variant for B1.29. 
 
 
 
                                                          
93 Diels (1897) 55: ‘εὐκυκλέος ist für den ersten Augenblick formell und inhaltlich so anstößig, dass es 
psychologisch schlechterdings unmöglich ist, sich die Genesis einer solcher Interpolation vorzustellen.' 
94 Bicknell (1979) 9-10. 
95 Wersinger (2008) 145. 
96 Mourelatos (2008) 154. 
97 Cf. Mourelatos (2008) 155. 
98 Diels (1897) 57. 
99 Ibidem. 
100 Jameson (1958) 24. 
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2.2 Being: the point the discourse always returns to 
 
 The goddess goes on to declare that there exist two ways. The first way is ‘is, and is not 
for Not-Being’ and the second path is ‘is not, and that it must needs not be’.101 Those ways are 
exclusive: one has to choose and cannot walk on both at the same time.102 The first road is said 
to be the road of persuasion and will be more elaborately explored in fragment B8. The κοῦρος 
is dissuaded from travelling on the second road, because it is practically impossible to find there 
what one looks for and even if one finds it, one cannot give a genuine account of it to others.103 
In B6 a third road is introduced, on which two-headed mortals wander, who ‘think that 
Being and Not-Being are the same and not the same’.104 Following this ‘backward turning’ 
(παλίντροπος, B6.9) path brings the traveller back to the starting point and gets him nowhere, 
since he says and unsays the same things, owing to the changeable nature of the objects he 
reflects upon.105 This third road will be more elaborately described in the δόξαι.106 
The fragment I shall now continue to discuss, B5, originally probably placed somewhere 
between fragment B2 and B8,107 reads as follows:  
 
                                                          
101 Respectively ὅπως ἐστίν τε καὶ ὡς οὐκ ἔστι μὴ εἶναι (B2.3) and ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν τε καὶ ὥς χρεών ἐστι μὴ 
εἶναι (B2.5). The meaning of ἐστί is highly disputed. There are three main advocated meanings: existential 
(‘…exists’) (e.g. Owen (1960) 94-95; Sedley (1999) 114-115), predicative/copulative (‘…is…’) (e.g. 
Calogero (1970) 17-18; Curd (1998) 4-5, 39), and veridical (‘…is the case’) (Kahn (1988) 238-253). There 
are also adherents of a ‘fused’ meaning (Kirk, Raven, and Schofield (1983) 246). For a solid discussion of 
the arguments for each type, see Wiesner (1996) 205-232. It is, however, anachronistic to expect that 
Parmenides was conscious of the use of these various types of εἶναι (Barnes (1982) 160; Sellmer (1998) 
16), so it seems best to me, as many scholars recently have argued (e.g. Waterfield (2000) 50; Miller 
(2006) 44; Palmer (2009) 95-97), not to restrict the meaning of ἐστί at this point. There have been several 
attempts to substitute the subject of ἐστί (e.g. ‘what can be thought or spoken of’ by Owen (1960) 14-16; 
‘what is’ by Diels (1897) 33 and Cornford (1939) 30n.2), but it seems best to preserve the indeterminacy of 
the verb at this point (cf. Mourelatos (2008) 47; Iribarren (2018) 101). The undetermined subject does not 
remain vague: it gains attributes in B8 (Sellmer (1998) 19). A possible reason for the absence of a subject 
at this point is that a subject would have distracted the κοῦρος from what is really important: ‘is’ and ‘is not’ 
(Gemelli Marciano (2008) 39). 
102 Robbiano (2005) 105. 
103 B2.6-8. Cf. Curd (1998) 50 and Robbiano (2005) 110-113. 
104 οἷς τὸ πέλειν τε καὶ οὐκ εἶναι τωὐτὸν νενόμισται / κοὐ τωὐτόν (B6.8-9). 
105 Osborne (1997) 32. There is an ongoing discussion as to which people these lines form a polemic: 
Heraclitus (Diels (1897) 68; Tarán (1965) 61-62), all rival philosophers (Coxon (1986) 300), or men in 
general (Mansfeld (1964) 32; Barnes (1982) 167). 
106 This third road is generally assumed to be identical to the δόξαι. For people who think that it is not the 
same, see Tarán (1965) 63 and Coxon (1986) 300. Some people have maintained that Parmenides’ 
goddess describes only two ways (since the second and the third one would be the same) (Calogero 
(1970) 40; Cordero (1979) 15; Curd (1998) 51-63; Waterfield (2000) 51n.4), but for arguments against 
this, see Wiesner (1996) 101-112; Mourelatos (2008) 91 n.47; Palmer (2009) 63-73. An overwhelming 
majority of scholars of Parmenides assumes three roads. 
107 Proclus, the only authority for this fragment, locates it after B8.25, but this is almost certainly not its 
original position (for arguments against this location, to my knowledge only advocated by Cornford (1939) 
41n.1, see Jameson (1958) 21 and Tarán (1965) 53). It seems improbable that Proclus was so far off as 
to transfer this quotation from the δόξαι to the ἀλήθεια (as Bollack (2006) 198 proposed, for arguments 
contra see Bodnar (1985) 57 and Sedley (1999) 122). A position between B1 and B2, as among others 
Coxon (1986) 286 has defended, cannot be excluded on basis of the remaining fragments, but a position 
between B2 and B8 seems best (cf. Mansfeld (1964) 92). 
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[…] ξυνὸν δέ μοί ἐστιν 
ὁππόθεν ἄρξωμαι˙ τόθι γὰρ πάλιν ἵξομαι αὖτις. (B5) 
 
To me it is common whence I begin, 
for I shall come back again to that place. 
 
This fragment refers to the motion from a starting point, either in space or in discourse.108 
This motion is the actual situation, there is nothing hypothetical about this fragment.109 The 
starting point is the same as the point which will somehow be returned to, since it is the ξυνός: 
‘common’ or ‘general’.110  
An old and by now altogether dismissed interpretation of this fragment is that it would 
refer to the circularity of the path of Being.111 A more influential analysis of this fragment takes it 
as referring to circularity of argument. It is not important which characteristic of Being is argued 
for first, since every characteristic of Being can be deduced from another. That way, in the end, it 
is possible to return to the discussion of the first characteristic.112 The adherents of this 
interpretation tend to translate ξυνόν as ‘indifferent’, but this meaning is unattested for ξυνός.113 
Furthermore, this meaning would render that it is arbitrary where the goddess starts her 
discourse about Being, which is contradicted by the carefully constructed argument of B8. The 
straightforward delineation of the properties of Being also counters this whole analysis of the 
fragment, since the goddess does not come back at the end of B8 to the argument against 
generation and destruction which has been her starting point.114 
I favour Reinhardt’s interpretation that the point to which the goddess always returns is 
the premise ‘is, and is not for Not-Being’.115 This premise forms the core of the whole argument 
of the ἀλήθεια and the goddess indeed repeatedly comes back to the meaning of the prevalence 
of the first path over the second (e.g. in B8.15-18 and B8.34-38).116  
Opponents of this interpretation point out that it is inconsistent with the plurality of 
possible starting points that is expressed by ὁππόθεν ἄρξωμαι, which would be superfluous if 
only one were imaginable.117 I firmly deny, however, that ὁππόθεν entails the notion of an 
indeterminate origin. Instead, it refers to a determinate starting point probably pinpointed in the 
preceding or following lost line: the proposition ‘is, and is not for Not-Being’.118 
                                                          
108 Tarán (1965) 51. 
109 Jameson (1958) 19. 
110 Bodnar (1985) 61. 
111 This position, defended by Diels (1897) 67 and reaffirmed by Ballew (1974) 195-196, has been rejected 
mainly because it is incompatible with the logical, deductive method employed in B8 (Jameson (1958) 18-
19; Bodnar (1985) 59; Curd (1998) 69). 
112 Mansfeld (1964) 106; Curd (1998) 69. 
113 Bodnar (1985) 61. 
114 Cf. Jameson (1958) 18-19; Tarán (1965) 52; Bicknell (1979) 9; Bodnar (1985) 59; Coxon (1986) 287; 
Sellmer (1998) 185. 
115 Reinhardt (1916) 60, followed by Bicknell (1979) 9; Sedley (1999) 122; Palmer (2009) 85n.104. 
116 Bicknell (1979) 9. 
117 Jameson (1958) 18; Sellmer (1998) 185; Wersinger (2008) 146. 
118 According to LSJ, ὁπόθεν means ‘whence’, ‘from what place’, so determinate. When one wishes to 
make this notion indeterminate, it is necessary to add something; cf. ὁπόθεν ἄν τύχῃ ‘from whencesoever’ 
in Plato, Theaetetus 180c (Liddell, Scott, Jones (1961) 1240). 
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The strong lexical and thematic connection between B6.3 (‘for I shall begin for you from 
this first path of inquiry’)119 and B5 also speaks in favour of this interpretation: the goddess 
announces the two first paths, then states that she shall return to the starting point at the end 
and continues to mark the point from which she starts. 
Parmenides here adhibits the widespread metaphor for poetry of the movement on a 
way. Changing a road or starting on a path are common poetological motifs to refer to the 
course of a poem: departing on a road for starting a poem and changing the way as a transition 
to close off a unit and start a new element of the narrative.120 The goddess’ remark that the 
discourse will return to the point it started from fits in well with this general poetological motif. 
Parmenides, however, does more than simply fitting in: he integrates it with another notion. By 
the use of the word ξυνός also alluding to fragment DK22 B103 of Heraclitus, which asserts that 
the beginning and the end of a circle are in common,121 he adds the element of circularity to the 
metaphor of the path and thereby creates a new motif: the metaphor of moving around in a circle 
for a discourse which returns to the same point.122 Circularity is thus employed as an image to 
reflect on the continuation of the discourse: it repeatedly comes back to the same point that 
Being is. 
 The goddess thus adds the notion of circularity in B5 to the poetological motif of the road 
in order to draw the attention of the κοῦρος and the audience to her most important message: 
‘is’. Not only does she repeat this premise frequently, she also directly reflects on the course of 
her discourse by highlighting the repeated returns to the ‘common point’ (ξυνός). The 
associations with a circle that this focus on ‘is’ carries (by alluding to Heraclitus’ circle which also 
shares its beginning with its end) contribute to shaping the theory of the goddess in the sense 
that they underline the most important point. The reflective function of the adhibition of circularity 
here thus figures the theory by reflecting on the shape of the discourse, which stresses the key 
premise that Being is. The underlining of this point also has a didactic function: besides the 
frequent references to this basis of Parmenidean philosophy, the audience is also presented 
with the visual image of a circle that assists them in understanding the flow of the discourse and 
in distinguishing between the main issues and matters of secondary significance. The metaphor 
of the circle thus steers the attention of both the κοῦρος and the audience towards the most 
important principle of Parmenidean philosophy. 
 
2.3 Comparison with a well-rounded ball 
 
 In fragment B8, the goddess gives an account of the signposts (σήματα) along the first 
path ‘is, and is not for Not-Being’. These signposts consist of the argumentations of various 
characteristics of Being,123 already announced in lines B8.2-6 and subsequently argued for. 
These announced propositions can be divided in 4 categories: 1) generation and destruction 
                                                          
119 Palmer (2009) 85 n.104. 
120 See for example Homer, Odyssey 8.499, where Demodocus’ starting a poem is described in terms of 
departure on a road. Pindar adhibits the metaphor of changing the way to complete a narrative in Pythian 
Ode 4.247-248. For more instances of the poetological metaphor of the road, see Nünlist (1998) 228-254. 
121 ξυνὸν γὰρ ἀρχὴ καὶ πέρας ἐπὶ κύκλου περιφερείας; cf. Coxon (1986) 287. 
122 This motif would later also be used by Empedocles (DK31 B35.1-2); cf. Nünlist (1998) 241. 
123 For a compelling discussion of why the signposts are not the announced characteristics in B8.2-6, but 
rather the following arguments for them, see Robbiano (2005) 151. 
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(ἀγένητον καὶ ἀνώλεθρον ‘ungenerated and imperishable’, argumentation in B8.6b-21); 2) 
quantity (οὗλον, ἕν, μουνογενές, συνεχές, ‘whole, one, unique, continuous’, argumentation in 
B8.22-25); 3) movement (ἀτρεμές, ‘immobile’, argumentation in B8.26-31); 4) completion 
(ἀτέλεστον, ‘complete/perfect’, argumentation in 32-33).124 The culmination of this description of 
the signposts along the path of Being is a comparison of Being to a well-rounded ball (B8.42-49): 
 
αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ πεῖρας πύματον, τετελεσμένον ἐστὶ 
πάντοθεν, εὐκύκλου σφαίρης ἐναλίγκιον ὄγκῳ, 
μεσσόθεν ἰσοπαλὲς πάντῃ˙ τὸ γὰρ οὔτε τι μεῖζον 
οὔτε τι βαιότερον πελέναι χρεών ἐστι τῇ ἢ τῇ. 
οὔτε γὰρ οὐκ ἐόν ἐστι, τό κεν παύοι μιν ἱκνεῖσθαι 
εἰς ὁμόν, οὔτ’ ἐόν ἐστιν ὅπως εἴη κεν ἐόντος 
τῇ μᾶλλον τῇ δ’ ἧσσον. ἐπεὶ πᾶν ἐστιν ἄσυλον˙ 
οἷ γὰρ πάντοθεν ἶσον, ὁμῶς ἐν πείρασι κύρει. (B8.42-49)125 
 
Now, since there is a furthest limit, Being is complete from every side, 
like the bulk of a well-rounded ball,  
and everywhere equally strong from the centre: for it must not be  
somewhat more here and somewhat less there. 
For neither does Not-Being exist, which could prevent Being from reaching its like, 
nor is Being such that it could be more than Being here and less there. 
Since it is all inviolable, for it is equal to itself  
from every side, it stays uniformly within its limits. 
 
 The structure of this passage fits with the common structure also applied in the 
argumentation of the other characteristics: the central argument is both preceded and followed 
by the statement to be proven.126 In this case, this statement is that Being is completed from all 
sides and held within bounds. The ἐπεί-clause shows, as it does in the argumentations for other 
characteristics, how the new passage relates to the earlier ones: it is the continuation of the 
proof of completeness of 32-33.127 Being complete means that Being extends itself uniformly 
within its limits, which is proven by two premises: 1) there is no Not-Being that can stop Being 
from reaching itself (lines 46-47) and 2) Being is everywhere in an equal measure (lines 47-
48).128 These premises are repeated in the conclusion that Being is inviolate129 and therefore 
                                                          
124 For a slightly different division in categories, see Ruben (2007) 165. 
125 42. τετελεσμένον] Coxon τετελεσμένου, virtually all other editors τετελεσμένον. 48. ἧσσον.] Coxon 
comma instead of full stop; see footnote 129. 
126 Barnes (1982) 202. 
127 Owen (1960) 93. 
128 Palmer (2009) 158. 
129 As Palmer (2009) 158 argued, the second half of B8.48 is a reason for the following conclusion rather 
than an explanation of the foregoing. It is a summary of the argument above that leads to the conclusion. 
A full stop should therefore be placed after ἧσσον, instead of the comma that all editors except Palmer 
punctate. 
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extends uniformly within its limits. The completeness from all sides is compared to the bulk of a 
well-rounded ball.130 
 There have been two main ways of interpreting this passage. The first is that the 
comparison of Being to the well-rounded ball means that Being itself is spherical. Followed by 
the modern scholars Cornford, Jameson, Mansfeld, Barnes, Meijer, Sedley, and Palmer,131 this 
interpretation is rooted in the peripatetic tradition.132 The adherents of this line often also argue 
for the form εὐκυκλέος in B1.29 (see subchapter 2.1), since it is a small step from spherical 
Being to a spherical or well-rounded truth. A crucial point in interpreting this passage is the 
tertium comparationis, which this group of scholars takes to be the spherical shape of the ball. 
According to them, the fact that Being is compared to a well-rounded ball means that Being itself 
is also spherical.133 Defending their literal reading of the passage, they point out that it is rather 
difficult, if not impossible, to interpret ‘larger’ and ‘smaller’ (μεῖζον βαιότερον, lines 44-45) in a 
metaphorical way instead of in a literal spatial one.134 Counterarguments against this equation of  
Being with sphericity include the fact that a ball or sphere can be divided (for example in 
hemispheres)135 and, more importantly, the question, if Being is indeed spherical, what would lay 
outside that sphere.136 If that is Not-Being, Not-Being would exist (which the goddess already 
forcefully contradicted in B2.5) and if that is Being, Being would not be a sphere.137 
The second manner of interpreting this passage takes the language slightly less literal 
and maintains that Being is not spherical, but only compared to a ball. Having its origins in the 
Platonic tradition,138 this interpretation is the most commonly defended in modern scholarship, 
and I join the fairly large group of scholars supporting it.139 Although I agree with Tarán that lines 
42-49 do not introduce a new attribute of Being,140 I firmly reject his verdict that this comparison 
adds nothing to Parmenides’ doctrine of Being.141 In the remaining part of this subchapter, I will 
argue that the comparison to a well-rounded ball figures the theory of Being and as such 
substantially contributes to the doctrine. Located at the end of the ἀλήθεια, these lines fulfil the 
didactic function of reminding the audience of some key attributes of Being by comparing the 
abstract notion of Being to a visual object that is memorised easier. Furthermore, when 
                                                          
130 Although σφαῖρα has sometimes been translated with ‘sphere’, the word means ‘ball’, since it contains 
a mass (ὄγκος) (which a stereometrical sphere lacks) and the adjective ‘well-rounded’ (εὐκύκλου) would 
be superfluous for a geometrically perfect sphere (Iribarren (2018) 106; cf. Jameson (1958) 15n.3). For 
the subtext of a physical, manufactured artefact in the descriptions of Being in the passage as a whole, 
see Mourelatos (2008) 128. 
131 Cornford (1939) 44-45; Jameson (1958) 15n.3; Mansfeld (1970) 418-419; Barnes (1982) 203-204; 
Meijer (1997) 38-40; Sedley (1999) 121-122; Palmer (2009) 155. 
132 For a subdivision of interpretation within the peripatetic tradition, see Iribarren (2018) 104. 
133 E.g. Jameson (1958) 15n.3.  
134 Sedley (1999) 121. 
135 Sedley (1999) 121-22. 
136 For more counterarguments, see Owen (1960) 96 and Sellmer (1998) 137-138. 
137 Among many others pointed out by Tarán (1965) 152. 
138 Iribarren (2018) 104. 
139 Owen (1960) 95-96; Tarán (1965) 148; Ballew (1974) 199; Coxon (1986) 337; Curd (1998) 93; Sellmer 
(1998) 132; Waterfield (2000) 54; Bollack (2006) 188; McKirahan (2008) 213; Mourelatos (2008) 121; 
Wersinger (2008) 143; Iribarren (2018) 105-106. 
140 Tarán (1965) 191. 
141 Tarán (1965) 159: ‘The passage adds nothing to Parmenides’ doctrine of Being.’ 
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compared to the sphericity in the δόξαι, this comparison reflects on the relation between the two 
accounts the goddess presents. 
I shall now continue to explain how this passage relates to the previous attributes of 
which it reminds the audience by examining the point of comparison between Being and a well-
rounded ball. This twofold comparison exists in both the homogeneity and the completeness of 
Being. To start off with the latter: Being is said to be completed from every side (τετελεσμένον 
ἐστί πάντοθεν, lines 42-43).142  The argument for the perfect completion of Being started in lines 
30-33, where it was called ‘not incomplete’ (οὐκ ἀτελεύτητον, line 32).143 The argument there 
was that Being is complete because it lacks nothing, here the links between the boundaries and 
the completion of Being are stressed: because the limit that determines Being is ultimate, the 
completion of Being is universal and established from all sides.144  
This ultimate limit should not, as the defenders of spherical Being assert, be understood 
spatially.145 The limit around Being is not mentioned for the first time in line 42; Being was 
already said to be held by Justice in her fetters (B8.14), to be changeless in the coils of huge 
bonds (B8.26), and to be held in the bondage of a limit by strong Necessity (B8.31). These limits 
should be taken metaphorically rather than spatially. The notion of spatial limits in Parmenides 
finds its roots in a common misconception of οὐκ ἀτελεύτητον in line 32. This characterization is 
interpreted as finiteness, although for Parmenides completeness has nothing to do with 
finiteness.146 Understood metaphorically, these bonds and fetters are the visual representation of 
Necessity which lies at the basis of the deduction of several attributes of Being from the basic 
premise ‘is, and is not for Not-Being’. By visually presenting Necessity as the personification of 
the choice between Being and Not-Being, the κοῦρος and the audience are assisted in grasping 
the truth about Being and the argumentation of several of its characteristics. Besides this 
didactic function of the bonds, Parmenides also transforms the traditional mythological motif of 
Necessity holding someone in bonds (e.g. Prometheus in Hesiod’s Theogony) into a form of 
abstract philosophical argumentation, thus polemically stressing the difference between his use 
of the motif (as a visualisation of the most abstract of topics) and the one of his poetic 
predecessors (as an action of a goddess in a mythological narrative). In Parmenides, the bounds 
are thus used metaphorically; in lines 42-49 they assert the completeness of Being, since it is 
held within the limits. 
The universal perfection of Being which is the result of the ultimate limit, then, is 
compared to a well-rounded ball, since both present a complete form. Because Being is 
completed, instead of presenting a different character to various observers, it presents one 
single nature, just like a well-rounded ball does.147 This is also what makes it so important that 
the ball is well-rounded (εὐκύκλου): when the physical artefact of a ball is not exactly round, it 
would present a different character depending on the angle one chooses to observe it.  
                                                          
142 πάντοθεν is taken with τετελεσμένον by the majority of editors and translators, as it should be. The 
exceptions are Kirk, Raven, Schofield (1983) 252; Curd (1998) 92; Mourelatos (2008) 123, who read it 
with the following εὐκύκλου (for arguments in favour of this reading, see Mourelatos (2008) 123n.24). 
143 Coxon (1986) 337. On the exact meaning of the word τέλος, see Mourelatos (2008) 121. 
144 Curd (1998) 92-93. 
145 Asserting the spatiality of these limits are among others Barnes (1982) 203 and Sedley (1999) 117. 
146 Tarán (1965) 151-152. 
147 Curd (1998) 93. 
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The fact that Being is compared to the expanding mass (ὄγκος)148 of this ball is highly 
significant for the second part of the tertium comparationis: the homogeneity of Being. The 
relation between the two points of comparison is stressed by the parallelism between πάντοθεν 
(first word of line 43) and μεσσόθεν (first word of line 44).149 The principle of homogeneity, that 
was already argued for in lines 22-25, is reformulated in these lines.150 Being is ‘from the centre 
everywhere equally strong/balanced’ (μεσσόθεν ἰσοπαλὲς πάντῃ, line 44).151 This homogeneity 
is proven by two arguments. Firstly, Not-Being, which could prevent Being from reaching 
homogeneity, does not exist (lines 46-47). Secondly, Being is equally divided and thus 
homogeneous: the amount of Being everywhere is the same; it is said to be nowhere μεῖζον (line 
44) and nowhere βαιότερον (line 45) than itself. I mentioned above that the adherents of a 
spherical Being asserted that it is impossible to translate these words metaphorically, since their 
literal meaning is ‘larger’ and ‘smaller’. I think that it is nevertheless possible to read these words 
adverbially and thus metaphorically without negating their literal meaning. When taken 
adverbially, this sentence claims that it is not possible for Being to be somewhat more there and 
somewhat less here. I support this meaning of the clause, but suppose that Parmenides chose 
these spatial terms to mark his comparison. Whereas these words are significant for the 
homogeneity of Being when read adverbially, they can be understood spatially when one has the 
mass of the ball Being is compared to in mind. I therefore agree with Sellmer that this 
ambiguous phrasing could have been chosen by Parmenides in order to connect Being and the 
ball to each other.152 The second point of comparison is thus the homogeneity: when Being is 
everywhere equally strong from the middle and thus homogeneous, it is in equilibrium, just like 
the mass of a well-rounded ball (which also needs to be the same in every point in order to 
obtain an equilibrium). 
Lines 42-49, then, containing the comparison of Being to a well-rounded ball, serve as 
the continuation of two earlier proven characteristics: the homogeneity and completeness of 
Being and unite two contrary forces: the expanding and the limitative. But the content alone is 
not sufficient reason to explain Parmenides’ motive to express these two forces through a 
comparison. Why did he decide to compare Being to a ball? First of all, the comparison, taken as 
a philosophical adaptation of the epic simile for the sake of heuristic analogies,153 can be used 
for an educational purpose, since the image of the comparison has the power to explain 
otherwise not immediately visible concepts.154 Because Being is one of the most abstract entities 
one could think of, such an analogy would help the audience to make sense of it.  
The placement of the comparison at the end of the logical enunciation of the 
characteristics of Being speaks in favour of this function of the comparison. After the discussion 
                                                          
148 McKirahan (2008) 213-214 discusses various possibilities to translate ὄγκος and argues in favour of 
‘physical extension’. 
149 Sellmer (1998) 130. 
150 Mansfeld (1964) 102. 
151 For this meaning of ἰσοπαλές, see Tarán (1965) 145. For arguments against the equality of radius as 
value of ἰσοπαλές, see Mourelatos (2008) 127. 
152 Sellmer (1998) 133. 
153 Most (1999) 351. 
154 Cf. Betegh (2002) 382, who also remarks that although such an image or visual representation can be 
useful, it can also give a misleading and distorted image when not accompanied by reflection on its status 
and limitations. We encounter this in Parmenides’ comparison, which, even though containing reflective 
information (as demonstrated in the main text), has been understood in misled ways. 
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of the signposts, a reference is made to the relation between thought and Being which had 
previously been discussed in fragments B2, B3, and B4.155 Because of the interruption of the 
continuous argument for completeness (in lines 32-33 and 42-49) which lines 34-41 carry, it has 
been suggested that these lines should be transposed.156 Aside from the fact that this means a 
grave interference of the text handed down by Simplicius, who quotes B8 as a whole, I would 
argue that the current location of these lines is uncontroversial and even self-evident. Following 
the signposts of Being, some more general aspects of the theory of ἀλήθεια are repeated. 
Finally, the audience is reminded of some of the key characteristics of Being: its completeness 
and homogeneity. The comparison is a heuristic tool leaving a lasting impression in the minds of 
the κοῦρος and the audience. The image of the well-rounded ball is easily remembered and can 
afterwards be used to deduce the characteristics of Being. The comparison of abstract Being to 
a visual sphere thus functions as a visual image that recapitulates the most important elements 
of the account of Being for the audience. A ball is chosen as representation because a) it is a 
visual image which will stick easier than an abstract concept and b) it is the only body that does 
not contradict all the given attributes that determine Being.157  
Its placement at the end of the report on Being not only serves to turn it into a climax, but 
also as a means to optimise contrast with the δόξαι. Whereas in lines 42-49 the important 
elements of the ball Being is compared to are its indivisible nature and the fact that this is one 
ball, the image of a dimensional form appears again in lines 55-59 (cf. subchapter 3.1), the main 
points there being its plurality and division in parts.158 
As I have shown, the comparison to a well-rounded ball functions as a heuristic tool and 
a mnemonic device for the audience to illustrate and underline the expanding and limitative 
forces of Being. I shall now continue to make a point that has previously been overlooked by 
scholars: the literary form of this comparison adds meaning to it, since it fulfils exactly the same 
function as the content of the comparison itself, namely stressing both the completeness and 
homogeneity of Being. The narrative structure functions as a deictic frame: it encapsulates the 
whole comparison, but at the same time, it also indicates the meaning of the comparison by 
demonstrating it.  
The limitative force is symbolized by the positioning of the word ‘limits’. This notion of 
limits forms a ringcomposition, being expressed by πεῖρας at the start of line 42 and ἐν πείρασι 
at the end of line 49.159 The mention of limits encloses the comparison in the same way that the 
ultimate limit encircles Being. It is not possible to extend outside the limit. Just like Being, entirely 
confined within its limits, the comparison to a well-rounded ball is restricted to lines 42-49. 
Outside the limits formed by the ringcomposition of πεῖρας entailing the comparison, no mention 
at all is made of the resemblance of Being to the mass of a well-rounded ball.  
Within the limits of the ringcomposition which encapsulates the comparison, nothing else 
is mentioned than logical steps of the argumentation of the tertium comparationis (cf. the 
structure of the passage described above). The inside of the comparison therefore consists of 
only the comparison, just like the inside of the limits contains only Being. 
                                                          
155 Curd (1998) 75-76. 
156 Palmer (2009) 139. For counterarguments, see Jameson (1958) 15n.2 and Sedley (1999) 119. 
157 Iribarren (2018) 106. 
158 Tarán (1965) 159; cf. Iribarren (2018) 107-108. 
159 Iribarren (2018) 106. 
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The comparison of Being to a well-rounded ball functions as a mnemonic device to 
underline the completeness and homogeneity of Being, but the comparison itself is explained by 
its very structure, which by means of analogy also points to the completeness and homogeneity 
of the description of the comparison. The effect of this is that the content of the comparison and 
the message it wants to convey (that one should remember that Being is complete and 
homogeneous) is strengthened and visually demonstrated by the structure of this very message. 
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Chapter 3: Circularity as figuring concept in the δόξαι  
 
 The ἀλήθεια is followed by a part of the poem which was presumably significantly 
longer:160 the δόξαι. These δόξαι are the opinions of mortals,161 which are regarded as deceptive 
(ἀπατηλόν, B8.52), but nevertheless included by the goddess, lest any mortal opinion may 
outstrip the κοῦρος (B8.60-61). Although only about 10 per cent of the original δόξαι are 
transmitted to us,162 we know that it dealt with a broad variety of topics, including cosmology, 
cosmogony,163 astronomy, theogony, physiology of reproduction, and human cognition.164 Some 
of the gaps in our knowledge about Parmenides’ δόξαι are filled by doxographical accounts.165 I 
shall, however, only treat the doxographical accounts if they clarify the fragments under 
discussion. The doxographies as such fall outside the scope of this thesis and will not be 
discussed in their own right, since understanding figuring techniques through the words of an 
intermediate author would become too speculative.  
 This chapter will deal with three passages in which circularity is directly or indirectly 
employed to figure the theory of the δόξαι. The first section is about the error of the mortals 
laying at the basis of the δόξαι. Circularity is not directly evoked here, but the positing of μορφαί 
(‘Forms’, B8.53) attributed to the mortals invokes the comparison between the ἀλήθεια and the 
δόξαι by the location of this passage so shortly after the comparison to the well-rounded ball 
discussed in chapter 2.3. This juxtaposition results in the didactic figuration of the error of the 
mortals, since this error is made visible by reified and visual forms which point at the similarities 
between the ἀλήθεια and the δόξαι. However, it also reflects on the conflict between unity and 
duality laying at the basis of the doctrines by the contrast between the two cosmogonical forms 
and unified Being. 
 The second subchapter will elaborate on the way that these two Forms, Fire and Night, 
shape the doctrine of the δόξαι even more clearly in the way the universe is organised: in 
concentric rings. These circular rings are didactic, because they reveal how the cosmos works. 
They also carry a reflective element on the relation between ἀλήθεια and δόξαι. On the one 
hand they stress some key differences; on the other hand, the recurring theme of circularity also 
unites the two compositional sections. 
 The last section of this chapter will be about a particularly good example of the deceptive 
character of the δόξαι: the moon. As a moving sphere composed out of the two elements, it 
reflects on the ἀλήθεια-δόξαι relation in the same way as the spherical cosmos described in the 
preceding subchapter. But the moon is more than simply didactic and reflective in that manner; it 
also invokes the deceptive character of appearances through a polemic pun to Homeric word-
                                                          
160 Estimates of the size of the δόξαι vary from 75 to 80 per cent of the whole poem (respectively Iribarren 
(2018) 110 and Palmer (2009) 160).  
161 For a compelling argumentation to prefer ‘opinions’ as a translation of δόξαι over ‘appearances’, see 
Mourelatos (2008) 195-197. 
162 Generally accepted estimate of Diels (Diels (1897) 29). 
163 Fragment B10 clearly states that both the origin and nature of the cosmos will be discussed, so the 
δόξαι comprises both a cosmogony and a cosmology. There is an ongoing discussion as to which 
category fragment B12 belongs; for an overview of the viewpoints, see Mansfeld (1964) 163n.1. 
164 Cf. Tor (2015) 4. 
165 For a short overview of the knowledge transmitted in doxography, see Palmer (2009) 160-161. 
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use, inviting the κοῦρος and the audience to reflect on the deceptive character of the δόξαι 
which is so very essential to it. 
 These three case-studies will thus demonstrate how instances of circularity figure the 
theory of the δόξαι in several ways: didactic (visual description of the two forms chosen by the 
mortals), reflective (on the relation between ἀλήθεια and δόξαι carrying both similarities and 
differences), and polemic (using a pun to Homer to underline the deceptiveness of the δόξαι). 
 
3.1 Mistake of the mortals 
 
 Essential to the question what exactly the mistake of the mortals entails is the way one 
regards the δόξαι as a whole. The debated status of the δόξαι is due to its paradoxical nature: 
although the goddess calls them deceptive (ἀπατηλόν, B8.52) and says that they lack true 
conviction (ταῖς οὐκ ἔνι πίστις ἀληθής, B1.30), she nevertheless includes them in her revelation. 
Why would the goddess have chosen to incorporate these opinions? Does she nevertheless 
believe them to have a certain value, regardless of their deceptive nature? The reason she gives 
for revealing the δόξαι to the κοῦρος is to ensure that no mortal opinion may outstrip him (B8.60-
61), but does this mean that she grants to this compositional section a certain positive quality? 
This question, to which different answers have been given, has occupied a significant 
number of scholars. An answer which used to be common opinion, but is now quite disregarded, 
is that the δόξαι lack any positive value whatsoever. Its main purpose is dialectical: it underlines 
the superiority of the ἀλήθεια. Within the group of scholars providing this answer, opinions differ 
whether it consists of a collection of opinions of other philosophers,166 or whether Parmenides 
himself build this cosmogonical system to demonstrate that any philosophy is essentially flawed, 
although his is the best system possible.167  
Instead of focussing on the differences between the ἀλήθεια and the δόξαι, as the last 
group of scholars did, other scholars have focussed mainly on the similarities between the two 
parts of the goddess’ revelation. Although these scholars grant the existence of certain 
differences, they nevertheless argue that the goddess attributes a positive value to the δόξαι.168 
Palmer, for example, in his convincing argumentation stated that the reason that the δόξαι are 
false, is to be found in the lack of necessary Being in it.169 As shown in the second chapter, the 
object of the ἀλήθεια is Being. This is not simply Being, however, but ‘is, and is not for Not-
Being’ (B2.3), so necessary Being. According to Palmer, the δόξαι certainly have value in giving 
an account of the physical world (which is a different objective than the ἀλήθεια has), as long as 
none of the Forms equals Not-Being. The δόξαι simply are not subjected to the logical deduction 
that characterizes the ἀλήθεια and therefore lack genuine trustworthiness. 
Whereas I wish to make clear that I agree with Palmer’s position in this debate, this 
subchapter does not aim at dissolving this longstanding discussion on the value and the status 
                                                          
166 Diels (1897) 63; Barnes (1982) 156-157. This position is undermined by the fact that some scientific 
discoveries (such as the finding that the Morning Star and the Evening Star are identical) have been 
attributed to Parmenides, so the δόξαι cannot have consisted solely of opinions of other philosophers; cf. 
Sedley (1999) 123. 
167 Owen (1960) 89; Long (1963) 91. An important objection to such a position is that, since there are no 
levels of falsehood in Parmenides, no such things as a ‘best system possible’ exists; cf. Tarán (1965) 207. 
168 E.g. Reinhardt (1916) 25; Coxon (1986) 342; Tor (2015) 6.  
169 Palmer (2009) 161-163. 
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of the δόξαι, but to show in which ways circularity contributes to the relation between the ἀλήθεια 
and the δόξαι. From the short overview above, it should be clear that there are simultaneously 
similarities170 and differences171 between the two compositional parts of the poem, and in this 
subchapter, I shall demonstrate how the Forms of Light and Night, posited by the mortals, 
contribute to both the highlighting of essential differences and the underlining of some shared 
characteristics. 
The mistake of the mortals is clarified already in the very first verses of the δόξαι. Its 
deceptive nature is due to the positing of two Forms by mortals: 
 
[…] δόξας δ’ ἀπὸ τοῦδε βροτείας 
μάνθανε κόσμον ἐμῶν ἐπέων ἀπατηλὸν ἀκούων. 
μορφὰς γὰρ κατέθεντο δύο γνώμας ὀνομάζειν, 
τῶν μίαν οὐ χρεών ἐστιν, ἐν ᾧ πεπλανημένοι εἰσίν, 
ἀντία δ’ ἐκρίναντο δέμας. (B8.51-55) 
 
From this point learn human beliefs, 
listening to the deceptive composition of my words. 
For they decided172 to name two Forms, 
a unity of which it is not right to name, wherein men have gone astray, 
and they chose opposites in body. 
 
 The key phrase to understanding where the mortals went astray is τῶν μίαν οὐ χρεών 
ἐστιν, which has been interpreted in various ways. I shall argue that its correct translation is ‘a 
unity of which it is not right to name’. One should add ὀνομάζειν and οὐ belongs to χρεών ἐστιν 
rather than to ὀνομάζειν.173 The meaning of χρεών is fundamental to this phrase. As Mourelatos 
argued, χρῆ-cognates in Parmenides do not express the notion of necessity (‘a unity of which it 
is not necessary to name’), but the notion of aptness and propriety (‘a unity of which it is not right 
to name’).174 The sentence therefore does not convey the absence of an obligation but the 
                                                          
170 Similarities include the appearance of Dike and Ananke in both parts (Morgan (2000) 86), the 
adhibition of σήματα (Deichgräber (1959) 62), and the similar use and transformation of ancient poetic 
traditions (Bollack (2006) 197). An excellent summary of the similarities is given by Mourelatos (2008) 
248-249. 
171 Outside the obvious differences of unity versus plurality and the genuine account of Being versus the 
false account of the physical world, the differences entail for example the different meaning of νόος in the 
two parts (Wiesner (1996) 160) and the distinctive use of κρίσις (Tor (2015) 14-16). For an extensive list of 
verbal and conceptual differences, see Mourelatos (2008) 232-234. 
172 Almost all editors choose γνώμας, only Furley (1973) 6 prefers the variant γνώμαις. Mourelatos (2008) 
228-230 has an excellent interpretation of γνώμας which also explains how γνώμαις entered the textual 
tradition: the line has two different meanings to two different audiences (‘they decided’ to the mortals; ‘they 
did not decide/they were of two minds’ to the more exclusive audience of the κοῦρος and those who 
grasped her argument about Being) and readers could not resist bringing the meaning meant for the 
second audience out in the open by positing γνώμαις, thereby destroying the subtle irony and ambiguity. 
173 Meijer (1997) 203.  
174 Mourelatos (2008) 84. 
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assertion of disproval. This disapproval is uttered by the goddess, so the opinion conveyed in 
these lines is hers.175 
 The meaning of the relative phrase τῶν μίαν has been under discussion, too. Aristotle 
has taken it to mean ‘one of which’, thus pinpointing the mistake as the naming of one of the two 
Forms. Aligning Fire with Being and Night with Not-Being,176 he believed the mistake of the 
mortals to be the positing of Night. His position, or the adaptation in which the mistake is the 
positing of either Form, has been taken over by some modern scholars.177 An important linguistic 
objection discounts this position of taking τῶν μίαν to signify ‘one of which’: the meaning of τῶν 
ἑτέρην would be assigned to τῶν μίαν, which is improbable, since there are examples of μία 
meaning ‘one of two’ only about thousand years after Parmenides.178 
 Two other interpretations of this clause can be easily dismissed. τῶν μίαν cannot mean 
‘none of which’, as Cornford advocated,179 since τῶν μίαν οὐ is not the same as οὐδετέραν.180 
The goddess could also not be asserting that the mortals should have named two Forms instead 
of one (‘of which it is not right to name only one [sc. without the other]’), thus criticizing the Ionian 
philosophers who posited only one Form,181 since this (a) would again imply τῶν μίαν to mean 
τῶν ἑτέρην,182 and (b) would be incoherent as a criticism of the mortals, who actually posit two 
Forms.183 
 The only remaining possibility is taking τῶν μίαν as ‘a unity of which’, as Tarán and 
Mansfeld have argued.184 This translation does more justice to the Greek, its rendering being 
paralleled in Aeschylus.185 What exactly does ‘a unity of which it is not right to name’ mean? 
What does the mistake of the mortals entail according to the goddess? The problem is not that 
the mortals believe that the two Forms exist, but rather that they think that they are a unity. 
Although both Forms entail Being and thus ‘are’, they are definitively not the same ‒ the equality 
expressed in line B9.4 should not be mistaken for identity. A unity cannot and should not be 
formed out of them, since they are opposites and therefore far from identical to each other. It is 
not a problem to posit two Forms and to make a cosmology out of them, although this system 
cannot be as trustworthy as the ἀλήθεια because it doesn’t follow the strictly deductive rules of 
necessary logic. The problem of the mortals is not the system they pose, but the fact that they 
falsely think that their system, described in the δόξαι, falls under those rules. They think that the 
two Forms out of which their cosmology is built can form a unity and as such be subject to the 
rules of the ἀλήθεια or even be equal to Being. Although both Forms encompass Being (since a 
                                                          
175 It has been argued that the opinion in these lines is the one of the mortals (‘a unity of which [they say] it 
is not right to name’), e.g. by Tarán (1965) 220. But, as Mourelatos (2008) 84 noted, this would entail an 
implausible shift from the first person to the third person. 
176 Aristotle, Metaphysics 987a1-2. 
177 Following Aristotle in regarding the positing of Night as the mistake is Fränkel (1955) 180. The adapted 
version is defended by Long (1963) 99; Sedley (1999) 124; Mourelatos (2008) 85-86. 
178 Mansfeld (1964) 124.  
179 Cornford (1939) 46. 
180 Mansfeld (1964) 124. 
181 This position was defended by Coxon (1986) 344. 
182 Tarán (1965) 219-220. 
183 Tor (2015) 16. 
184 Mansfeld (1964) 126; Tarán (1965) 220. Although Tarán defends this translation, the line belongs, 
according to him, to the opinion of the mortals, rather than expressing the goddess’ view. 
185 Aeschylus, Prometheus Bound 209-210 (Mansfeld (1964) 126). 
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good cosmological system entailing also Not-Being is impossible), they remain contraries and 
therefore should not be regarded as a unity. The criticism of the goddess is thus not directed at 
the Forms themselves or at their being posited, but to the false conviction of mortals about them. 
The description of the physical world itself stands and even has a positive value186 (although 
inferior to the ἀλήθεια, but no system describing the physical world could ever follow the rules of 
the ἀλήθεια). The methodological reflection of the mortals on the way in which their system 
would be subjected to the rules lined out by the ἀλήθεια is astray: the false conviction of their 
system being compatible with the logical rules of necessity in the ἀλήθεια is the mistake of the 
mortals the goddess is condemning in these lines. 
The Forms the mortals posited are visually described. The word used to indicate the 
Forms of Fire and Night is μορφαί, ‘Forms’ (B8.53). The goddess then says that the two chosen 
Forms are opposites ‘qua body’ (δέμας, B8.55). This very word δέμας is again used in reference 
to the Form of Night in B8.59. μορφαί and δέμας are words for a visual, dimensional structure. 
The lines in which these terms are introduced follow closely upon the comparison to the ball 
which ended the ἀλήθεια: in B8.50-51 the goddess asserts that her discourse on Being is 
finished and that she will continue to describe the physical world of the δόξαι. In the comparison, 
one single form was at stake: a well-rounded ball. Immediately after the transition, the goddess 
again mentions visual forms and shapes, but this time two different ones. Although the Forms of 
Fire and Night are itself not said to be circular (for explicitly circular shapes in the δόξαι, see 
subchapters 3.2 and 3.3), circularity is implicitly evoked through the comparison between the 
well-rounded ball and the other forms mentioned only so shortly afterwards. This is not to say 
that the two cosmogonical principles of the δόξαι possess the shape of a circle or sphere, but to 
argue that the visual language chosen to describe the Forms here invites reflection on the status 
of these Forms compared to Being, which is compared to the visual form of a well-rounded 
ball.187 The Forms in the δόξαι are not abstract, but concrete. Contrary to Being in the ἀλήθεια, 
they possess a body and shape rather than only being compared to it. Although the shape of the 
two cosmogonical principles remains unspecified, one could say that the mortals received the 
image of a ball from the ἀλήθεια and reified it into the more concrete Forms of Fire and Night, 
dividing it in two.188 
The Forms, although not spherical or circular, are thus described in a way which closely 
resembles the well-rounded ball Being is compared to. The fact that their description is 
formulated as it is, stressing the similarities between the two parts by referring to the respective 
visual shape, also underlines that the positing of the Forms as such is not the problem, as I 
argued above. At the same time, the positing of the two Forms figures the theory of the δόξαι by 
reflecting on the duality contrasting the unity of the ἀλήθεια, one of the main differences between 
the two revelations. This contrast becomes clearer because the unity and plurality are described 
in similar, visual terms of shape (whether compared or actual shape), making the difference 
more poignant. This reflective figuring of the theories also has a didactic function, since it 
visualizes the difference by visual, reified forms pointing out both similarities and contrasts, thus 
confirming that the mistake of the mortals is not in positing the two Forms, but in the thought that 
these two Forms are a unity, like the one of the ἀλήθεια. 
                                                          
186 Cf. Mansfeld (1964) 126. 
187 Cf. Iribarren (2018) 107. 
188 Iribarren (2018) 109. 
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3.2 Concentric rings and spheres figuring the theory 
 
 The two Forms posed by the mortals, described in the previous subchapter, are 
cosmogonical principles from which everything in the physical world and universe is made. This 
second section will elaborate on the way that Fire and Night figure the doctrine of the δόξαι in 
the way the universe is organised. I will argue that the spherical cosmos is didactic and reflective 
on many elements of the relation between ἀλήθεια and δόξαι. In order to grasp how these 
didactics and this reflectivity work, I shall first describe the picture of the universe presented in 
the δόξαι. 
 The only direct information we have about Parmenides’ perception of the cosmos in the 
δόξαι is fragment B12. Having been cited three times by Simplicius189 for the purpose of showing 
that Parmenides posed an efficient cause,190 these lines show how the heavenly bodies came 
into being. The described cosmos is a spherical one191 consisting of several layers: 
 
αἱ γὰρ στεινότεραι πλῆντο πυρὸς ἀκρήτοιο, 
αἱ δ’ ἐπὶ τῇς νυκτός, μετὰ δὲ φλογὸς ἵεται αἶσα˙ 
ἐν δὲ μέσῳ τούτων δαίμων, ἣ πάντα κυβερνᾷ. (B12.1-3)192 
 
For the smaller ones [sc. rings]193 were filled with unmixed Fire, 
and those next to them with Night, and between them [sc. between the rings of Fire and 
the rings of Night] a portion of Fire is brought: 
in the middle of these is the goddess, who governs everything. 
 
 The spherical cosmos thus consists of several rings (στεφάναι). Although the exact 
meaning of Parmenides’ στεφάναι is disputed, a majority of scholars takes it to signify ‘rings’ 
rather than ‘spheres’.194 These rings are cylindrical rings, of hollow form, spherical shells which 
together form one large sphere. From these three lines, however, it is quite impossible to 
reconstruct the outlook of the universe. Doxography can help us to fill the blanks in our 
knowledge. Aetius gave an account of the cosmos in Parmenides’ δόξαι, basing himself on the 
information Theophrastus transmitted (A37).195 Although Aetius is by some scholars regarded as 
having misinterpreted B12,196 it is possible to combine B12 and A37 into one system in a 
                                                          
189 Bollack (2006) 238. 
190 Morrison (1955) 61. 
191 Betegh (2002) 402. 
192 The fragment continues for another three lines with a specification of how the δαίμων governs 
everything: by bringing about the mixing of the male and the female. 
193 According to the communis opinio, στεινότεραι should refer to the στεφάναι (e.g. Bollack (2006) 239). 
194 Only Diels (1897) 104 takes στεφάναι to be pure spheres. Fränkel (1955) 183n.1 and Coxon (1986) 
364 prefer the translation ‘rings’. Although Tarán (1965) 233, Finkelberg (1986) 316n.41, and Iribarren 
(2018) 111 choose the translation ‘spheres’, they pose a system with spherical rings highly similar to mine. 
195 Fränkel (1955) 183. 
196 Fränkel (1955) 184: ‘[die] erhaltene falsche Auslegung des erhaltenen echten Textes’; Tarán (1965) 
239: ‘The report of Aetius contains a gross misunderstanding of fr. 12.1-2’; Coxon (1986) 363: ‘Aetius’ 
assertion that the outer envelope is στερεόν [‘solid’] appears to be a misinterpretation of ὄλυμπος ἔσχατος 
[‘extreme olympus’].’ 
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convincing way, as Finkelberg has shown.197 In the following paragraph, I shall explain the 
outlines of this cosmological system of the spherical universe according to Finkelberg. 
 At the outside of the universe a solid outer wall is posed, which is called ὄλυμπος 
ἔσχατος in fragment B11.2-3. Directly under this outer shell of the universe, there are rings of 
pure, unmixed Fire (B12.1). These rings of Fire form the aether,198 in which ‘all signs of the 
aether’ (τά τ’ ἐν αἰθέρι πάντα σήματα, B10.1-2), i.e. the planets,199 are located. Under the fiery 
rings, a number of mixed rings is located, consisting of a mixture of Fire and Night (the 
atmosphere, described in the second half of line 12.2), followed by a ring of pure Night. This ring 
of pure Night is the spherical earth, posited at the centre of the universe.200 Moving from outside 
inwards, the earth is followed by a subterranean Fire and a solid centre. The location of the 
goddess in this universe is debated, since ἐν δὲ μέσῳ τούτων (‘in the middle of these’, B12.3) 
can be interpreted in several ways, but it seems best to identify her with the innermost ring of 
Fire.201 
 This system of the universe does more than didactically show the κοῦρος and the 
audience how the cosmos looks according to the δόξαι of mortals, since as a whole it could and 
should also be regarded as a theoretical object. For many smaller elements of this description, 
or the lost parts which we know of through doxographies, contribute to a reflection of the issue of 
the relationship between the ἀλήθεια and the δόξαι and thus to the question of the unity of the 
composition of Parmenides’ poem. In the following paragraphs, I shall elaborate on the manner 
in which some aspects of Parmenides’ description of the cosmos stress differences and 
therefore key characteristics of the two compositional parts through the close resemblance in 
circularity. 
The most eye-catching resemblance between the structure of the universe and the 
ἀλήθεια is the spherical shape (respectively of the cosmos and of the well-rounded ball). The 
geometrical solid of the ἀλήθεια is converted by the mortals into a perceptible physical body 
                                                          
197 Finkelberg (1986) 303-317. 
198 Finkelberg (1986) 314. This identification is made on basis of Cicero’s account in De Natura Deorum 
1.11.28. 
199 Coxon (1986) 353. 
200 Finkelberg (1986) 307. The earth is not, as Diels (1897) 105 and Coxon (1986) 363 argued, identical to 
the solid centre in the middle of the universe, but rather to the ring of Night, thus making the innermost 
ring of Fire a subterranean one instead of one surrounding the earth. For a discussion of the evidence in 
favour of the sphericity of the earth, see Tarán (1965) 234n.15 and Burkert (1972) 304-308. For the 
counterargument that στρογγύλη can also mean ‘circular’ instead of ‘spherical’, see Morrison (1955) 64.  
201 This line has already traditionally been understood in two different ways: in the middle of the mixed 
rings (Aetius on basis of Theophrastus) or in the middle of the universe (Simplicius) (cf. Diels (1897) 107). 
Reinhardt (1916) 13 followed Aetius in locating the goddess in the middle of the mixed rings, but this is 
unlikely, since Aetius’ account is based on a corrupt sentence of Theophrastus (at least two words, and 
probably even more, are missing; cf. Finkelberg (1986) 311). Meijer (1997) 217n.1205 enumerates the 
arguments why the goddess cannot be the aether, as Coxon (1986) 368-370 argued. Although it is 
possible that the location is not exactly pinpointed (Mansfeld (1964) 164) or that it is simply somewhere 
between the two elements in order for the goddess to fulfil her cosmogonical tasks (Iribarren (2018) 112), 
there are several arguments in favour of the identification of the goddess to the subterranean ring of Fire: 
(a) if Parmenides would personify Fire, a female deity would be a logical choice, since according to his 
biological theory, the female is hotter than the male, (b) Aetius says that the goddess is a ring (and the 
subterranean Fire forms a ring around the solid centre), and (c) Cicero confirms that the goddess is a ring 
of Fire (Finkelberg (1986) 311). 
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which is a possible starting-point of becoming.202 Although the ἀλήθεια and the δόξαι thus share 
the spherical form, there are also important differences.  
First of all, whereas Being was only compared to a well-rounded ball, the cosmos of the 
δόξαι actually is spherical. Furthermore, Being was compared to one single ball, reinforcing the 
unity, whereas plurality is introduced in the δόξαι: there are several spherical heavenly bodies 
and there are multiple στεφάναι. Becoming, which is a key characteristic of the δόξαι, is not only 
apparent in the plurality, but also in the heterogeneity of the various στεφάναι. The στεφάναι 
filling up the whole cosmos consist of either Fire or Night or a mixture of both. This contrasts 
sharply with the homogeneity of the well-rounded ball. Fourthly, this ball was unmovable and 
held still within limits, unlike the revolving heavens and the heavenly bodies turning in circles 
within their rings. The contrast between the two spheres is also polemically expressed on a 
word-level. The radial invariance, expressed in spatial terms in B8.44-45 (οὔτε τι μεῖζον οὔτε τι 
βαιότερον, ‘neither somewhat more here nor somewhat less there’), contrasts with the spatial 
descriptions of the radial difference in B12.1-3 (αἱ γὰρ στεινότεραι…αἱ δ’ ἐπί…μετὰ δέ…ἐν δὲ 
μέσῳ, ‘for the smaller ones…and those next to them…and between them…and in the 
middle’).203 These phrases, expressing location, thus figure the theory of respectively the 
ἀλήθεια and δόξαι by a polemic contrast to each other. Finally, the furthest limit which held 
Being in place (πεῖρας πύματον, B8.42) is reified by the mortals to the outer wall which forms the 
limit of the universe (ὄλυμπος ἔσχατος, B11.2-3). Likewise, as Necessity was said to hold Being 
in her bounds (B8.14-15, B8.31), this personified goddess fettered heaven to contain the 
boundaries of the stars (ὥς μιν ἄγουσ’ ἐπέδησεν ἀνάγκη πείρατ΄ ἔχειν ἄστρων, Β10.6-7).204 
Whereas the notions of the limits and Necessity in the ἀλήθεια were metaphorical, abstract, and 
posited to represent the conclusions of logic deduction, the mortals in the δόξαι reify them and 
give them a physical place in their universe. 
One could ask oneself whether the system of the spherical cosmos in the δόξαι is not 
only didactic, reflective, and polemic to the ἀλήθεια in the aforementioned ways, but also 
polemic to Parmenides’ predecessors. It is very well possible that the cosmological account of 
the δόξαι also figures its theory in that regard, but the loss of a substantial part of the δόξαι 
makes it impossible to assert anything on this topic with more certainty than mere speculation. 
According to ancient doxography, Parmenides was the first to pose a spherical earth.205 If he is 
right, we can assume that Parmenides stresses this difference to his predecessors, albeit 
perhaps implicitly. The words he used to distance his own spherical world from the world views 
of his predecessors (e.g. Anaximander’s disc-shaped earth) could have figured the theory of his 
δόξαι in a polemic way, but since these words are not transmitted, we cannot say anything more 
about it. 
The spherical cosmos of the δόξαι thus figures the theory in a didactic sense, for it 
demonstrates the views of the δόξαι about the cosmos. As a theoretical object, the system is 
also reflective on some key differences between the ἀλήθεια and the δόξαι (compared vs. actual 
sphericity, homogeneity vs. mixture, immovability vs. movement, unity vs. plurality). The 
stressing of these differences is only possible by the similarity in the recurring themes of mainly 
                                                          
202 Cornford (1939) 48. 
203 Mourelatos (2008) 233-234. 
204 Coxon (1986) 356; Morgan (2000) 72. 
205 Diogenes Laërtius 9.21 (Burkert (1972) 304n.20). 
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circularity, but also of bounds and Necessity, which emphasize the close connection between 
the two compositional unities. 
 
3.3 The figuration of deceiving appearances by the wandering moon 
 
 One of the spheres which is part of the cosmological account on the universe figures the 
theory of the δόξαι in particular. The moon, as a spherical heavenly body, will prove to be 
essential in understanding the figuration of the δόξαι, since it reflects on their deceptive 
character. I shall argue that through a pun to Homer the ‘wandering’ nature of the moon figures 
the relation between the actual nature of the δόξαι and the opinion the mortals themselves have 
on it. One transmitted line about the moon is vital to this reflection:  
 
νυκτιφαὲς περὶ γαῖαν ἀλώμενον ἀλλότριος φῶς (B14) 
 
 Shining in the night, wandering around the earth, an alien light. 
 
 From the transmitted fragments, we even receive a little more information about the 
moon: it is round-faced (κύκλωπος...σελήνης, Β10.4), its deeds are wandering (ἔργα...περίφοιτα, 
B10.4), and it always gazes at the rays of the sun (αἰεὶ παπταίνουσα πρὸς αὐγὰς ἠελίοιο, B15). 
Since the moon only radiates ‘an alien light’ and always ‘gazes at the rays of the sun’, it lacks 
illumination of its own. Parmenides might have been the first to discover that the moon is 
illuminated by the sun, rather than producing light of its own.206 This observation also accounts 
for the faces of the moon: the apparent shape of the moon is in fact caused by the relative 
position of the moon to the sun. This can only be the case when the moon is not only ‘round-
faced’, but actually spherical.207 
 The doxographical tradition provides us with even more knowledge: the moon is made 
out of a mixture of air (which has separated out from the earth) and Fire.208 Because it consists 
of a mixture, it is also located in the mixed rings, unlike the sun and the stars, which, entirely 
composed of Fire, are placed in the outer ring of Fire.209 
 The moon can therefore on itself also be seen as a theoretical object, which reflects on 
the ἀλήθεια-δόξαι relation in the same way as the spherical cosmos as a whole (cf. subchapter 
3.2). Just like the spherical cosmos, the moon is actually spherical (in contrast to the compared 
sphericity of Being), in movement (opposing the immobility of the ball in the ἀλήθεια), and 
heterogeneous, because of the mixture of air and Fire (diverging from the homogeneity inside 
the ball). These three contrasts between the moon and the well-rounded ball of the ἀλήθεια are 
evoked by the similarity in shape, just as it was the case between the spherical cosmos and the 
well-rounded ball. The only difference with the way this whole cosmos reflects on the key 
characteristics of the δόξαι is the absence of the unity-plurality contrast in the description of the 
moon (which can easily be explained, since the moon is one element of the plurality described in 
                                                          
206 Sedley (1999) 123. 
207 Coxon (1986) 375. 
208 A37, cf. Tarán (1965) 245. For a clear overview on the doxographical contribution to our knowledge 
about the moon, see Coxon (1986) 373. 
209 Finkelberg (1986) 315. 
 43 
 
the δόξαι, rather than itself also encompassing plurality). The moon is thus in these ways 
reflective on the relation between the two revelations of the goddess and also didactic, since it 
shows the δόξαι’s conception of the celestial body of the moon. 
 Besides figuring the theory of the δόξαι in these two ways, the moon is also an excellent 
example of the deceptive character of the opinions of the mortals. I shall argue that it entails a 
reflection on the tension between appearances and nature which is the foundation of the δόξαι. 
The reflection on this discrepancy between the true nature and false and deceiving appearances 
can be seen on three different levels. 
 First of all, the moon has changing appearances: it seems to wax and wane. Although it 
thus seems to transform, Parmenides’ theory proves that it doesn’t: since it is a spherical body 
receiving its light from the sun, the appearance of the moon to the people on earth changes, 
whereas it actually remains the same. This deceptive aspect in the light of the moon invites to 
reflection on the deceptive aspect of the δόξαι. Although the mortals are convinced that their 
theory is sound because it is subjected to the logical rules of the ἀλήθεια (see subchapter 3.1), 
the goddess can see its true nature: although valuable, nevertheless deceptive. Although the 
mortals have convinced themselves to have brought forth a solid cosmological and 
cosmogonical theory, it actually is not. Similar to the contrast between the apparent character of 
the δόξαι (to the mortals) and its actual status (according to the knowing goddess), another 
image is posited to reflect on this contrast between appearances and nature: the moon. The 
epistemological gap between the apparent and actual character of the moon thus reflectively 
figures the issue of the mistake of the mortals in the δόξαι. 
 Secondly, the ‘alien light’, ἀλλότριος φῶς (B14), is a pun to the Homeric word-use of a 
stranger. Homer used the phrase ἀλλότριος φώς, ‘a man from somewhere else’, to designate a 
stranger or wanderer. The neutrum φῶς (‘light’) is a homonym of the masculine φώς (‘man’).210 
By twisting this phrase and attributing it to the moon, Parmenides establishes a connection 
between the moon, whose light comes from the sun, and a wandering stranger in the minds of 
the κοῦρος and his audience, to whom the Homeric phrase ἀλλότριος φώς was familiar. The fact 
that the moon also ‘wanders over the earth’ (περὶ γαῖαν ἀλώμενον, B14) contributes to this 
connection. When this allusion to wandering is made in the δόξαι, any reader will remember the 
characterization of the mortals by the goddess in fragment B6: they ‘wander two-headed’ 
(πλάζονται δίκρανοι, B6.5) on the path of the δόξαι. Wandering is in Parmenides always a signal 
of falsehood: the subject does not manage to reach its goal straightforwardly.211 Thus, 
Parmenides again reflects on the appearance-nature discrepancy: in the same way that the 
moon seems to send out its own light, but in fact only reflects the light of the sun, the mortals 
regard their own theory to be sound, whereas in fact they wander. 
 Thirdly, it is possible that the aforementioned word-pun of ἀλλότριος φῶς is an allusion to 
a specific passage in Homer. When Penelope addresses Telemachus in the Odyssey, she says 
the following: 
 
καί κέν τις φαίη γόνον ἔμμεναι ὀλβίου ἀνδρός, 
ἐς μέγεθος καὶ κάλλος ὁρώμενος, ἀλλότριος φώς. (Homer, Odyssey 18.218-219)212  
                                                          
210 Bollack (2006) 270. 
211 Mourelatos (2008) 224-225. 
212 Wright (1997) 15-16 mistakenly referred to this passage as Odyssey 18.719, which does not exist. 
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 And someone would say that you are the son of a rich man,  
when he looked only to your stature and beauty, himself being a stranger. 
 
If the designation of the moon’s alien light is indeed an allusion to this passage, it would 
reflect on the appearance-nature relation in a third way. The ἀλλότριος φώς of this Homeric 
passage is somebody from faraway, who has not been acquainted with Telemachus. Judging by 
appearance, he would say that Telemachus is the son of a rich man. Although this information is 
true in this case, this allusion does evoke the topos of appearances and the question whether 
they are right or wrong. Parmenides very subtly invoked this theme of appearances by adding a 
pun to this passage to his description of the origins of the Light which mortals see as coming 
from the moon. 
 Concludingly: besides didactically demonstrating the mortals’ view on the moon, this 
passage figures the theory of the δόξαι by reflecting on some key differences between the 
ἀλήθεια and the δόξαι (e.g. homogeneity versus mixture). Furthermore, it reflects on the 
discrepancy between (false) appearances and (true) nature in three ways, thus offering the 
κοῦρος and the audience food for thought about the status of the δόξαι. Firstly, the moon’s 
appearance to mortals is different than its actual nature: although it seems to wax and wane, it 
always remains the same sphere reflecting the light of the sun. Secondly, by alluding to a 
Homeric stranger in the phrase ἀλλότριος φῶς, Parmenides’ goddess evokes the theme of 
wandering mortals whose theory is not trustworthy, although they think it is. This topos of the 
falseness of appearances is even evoked more specifically by the reference to a stranger 
judging Telemachus merely by appearance in ἀλλότριος φῶς. The moon as a spherical 
heavenly body is thus highly significant in figuring the theory of the δόξαι. 
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Conclusion 
 
 In this MA-thesis, I have provided an overview of the instances of circularity throughout 
the three sections of Parmenides’ philosophical poem, arguing that circularity, a notion in both 
form and content, comprises a theoretical significance in Parmenides’ doctrine. This 
philosophical importance lies in the fact that the instances in which circularity is evoked all figure 
Parmenides’ theory in some way. These means of figuration can be didactic, polemic, and/or 
reflective, and function on different levels. 
 The most basic level is the one on which circularity figures Parmenides’ narration or 
discourse. This is the case in the ringcomposition of the proem, in which the journey of the 
daughters of the Sun is reflected upon by the circular shape of the narration itself. This formal 
device of ringcomposition not only works didactically by pinpointing the location of the goddess 
as the night, but it also reflects on the form of Parmenides’ narration of the described journey. 
Another example of circularity as a theoretically employed notion on the level of the discourse is 
the statement of the goddess in which she alludes to a metapoetical path in shape of a circle, 
therefore always returning to the same point, thereby reflecting on the unfolding of her own 
discourse, which repeatedly comes back to the premise ‘is, and is not for Not-Being’. 
 On a second level, one aspect of Parmenides’ philosophy is figured, so either the 
ἀλήθεια or the δόξαι. The audience is for instance reminded of Being’s most important 
characteristics at the end of the argumentation by the way these features are comprised in the 
well-rounded ball. In the δόξαι, the way in which the moon reflects on their deceptive character 
figures the theory of this particular compositional section. 
 Polemic figuration plays a key role on the third level, on which in the case of the ἀλήθεια 
its theory is not only figured, but also contrasted with the δόξαι, and vice versa. Circularity is on 
this level employed to stress some key characteristics of the respective theory and to contrast 
them to the other revelation of the goddess. This degree of theoretical significance thus involves 
both the ἀλήθεια and the δόξαι. For example, the rings out of which the spherical cosmos in the 
δόξαι consists underline the mixture, movement, and plurality so characteristic of the δόξαι, 
effectively contrasting it to the homogeneity, immovability, and unity of Being in the ἀλήθεια. 
 On the highest theoretical level, the relation between the two revelations of the goddess 
is reflected upon externally. The metapoetical reflectivity of both the chariot’s wheels and the 
gate’s doors in the proem figures the unity of the whole poem; this unity being one of 
Parmenides’ most conceptual novelties. Even this highly abstract difficulty of the inclusion of the 
δόξαι, although they are said to be untrustworthy, is figured by circularity. 
 Concludingly, circularity contributes on many different levels throughout the poem to the 
figuration of Parmenides’ philosophy. It is not some mere decoration to his poem, but an 
irreplaceable means of expressing his doctrine which should not be underestimated. Further 
research could be done on the theoretical significance of circularity in the work of other 
Presocratic philosophers. Having written on a more abstract and theoretical level than his 
predecessors, Parmenides ultimately needed very refined tools to express his almost 
inexpressible thoughts. Circularity, however, is not the only means he employed. Other figuring 
devices awaiting further exploration are the literary motive of the returning female deities and 
resemantised mythological motives. Parmenides’ philosophical poem still abounds in unrevealed 
subtleties.  
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